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ARTICLE
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX:




The taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service' continue to
engage in a battle over whether the "substance over form"
doctrine applies to the determination of Federal estate and gift
tax consequences. 2 A decisive victory has yet to be claimed, with
* Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of Montana School of Law; L.L.M. Taxation
N.Y.U. School of Law (1990), recipient of the Harry J. Rudick Memorial Award for
Distinction in the Graduate Tax Program; J.D. High Honors, Univ. of Montana School of
Law (1985); B.A. Yale College (1982). The author would like to thank Professor J.
Martin Burke for his guidance. In addition, the author thanks Michelle Milhollin for
her research assistance, and Edward T. LeClaire for his thoughtful editorial comments.
1. Hereinafter the discussion refers to the Internal Revenue Service as the
"Service."
2. The issue of form over substance in the Federal estate and gift tax context once
again came to the forefront in the late 1990's with the popularity of the family limited
partnership. As the battle heated up in 1996, several prominent estate planning
commentators asserted during presentations at various estate planning continuing legal
education programs that the substance over form doctrine had no application in the
context of estate and gift tax planning, Their comments were triggered by the Internal
Revenue Service's initial attack on valuation discounts taken with respect to the transfer
1
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the taxpayer and the Service each winning at different stages of
the skirmish.
3
In its most recent attack on popular estate planning
strategies, the Service has urged the courts to define substance
by reference to the tax avoidance motive or intent of the
taxpayer. Were the courts to declare victory in favor of the
Service's subjective test, any certainty regarding the Federal
estate and gift tax consequences of a transfer would be severely
undermined. Courts should reject the Service's attack in favor
of a more certain approach that defines economic substance in
terms of the taxpayer's objective manifestations.
The Service, especially in the context of family limited
partnerships, advances the argument that the estate plan must
possess "economic substance." The Service sums up its analysis
as follows:
For more than 50 years, the courts have applied the economic
substance doctrine, or a variant thereof, in the income tax context
to disregard a diverse mix of transactions and entities that are
devoid of economic substance other than the generation of tax
benefits. The simple expedient of drawing up papers does not
control for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are
to the contrary. [Citations omitted.]
In ACM Partnership, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit distilled the many economic substance cases into one
of limited partnership interests. In a series of technical advice memoranda, the Service
attacked those limited partnerships formed shortly before death as lacking substance.
See Tech. Adv. Mems. 98-42-003 (July 2, 1998), 97-35-003 (May 8, 1997), 97-30-004 (Apr.
8, 1997), 97-25-002 (Mar. 3 1997), 97-23-009 (Feb. 24, 1997), 97-19-006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
At that time the Service had not fully developed its form over substance argument in the
context of the Federal estate tax. My initial reaction, as presented in a 1998 continuing
legal education presentation, was that indeed substance was important and, that to
achieve wealth transfer tax savings, the economic substance of the transaction must
match the form of the transaction. See, Form vs. Substance: Evaluating the Effectiveness
of Various Estate Planning Devices, Montana Tax Institute (1998). My definition of
economic substance, however, differs substantially from the Service's current definition.
The Service more fully developed its definition of economic substance in recent field
service advice. I.R.S. FSA 2001-43-004 (Oct. 26, 2001); I.R.S. FSA 2000-49-003 (Sept. 1,
2000). See also I.R.S. FSA 2002-05-002 (Feb. 1, 2002).
3. Recent taxpayer victories include the court holdings in Church v. United
States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 60,369, 85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 804, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 714 (W.D. Tex. 2000), affd by unpublished opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001)
and Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 506 (2000). In those cases the courts upheld the
validity of the family limited partnership despite the Service's lack of economic
substance argument. Internal Revenue Service victories include Estate of Reichardt v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000), and Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-246. In those cases the courts included the value of previously transferred
partnership interests in the donor's gross estate based on the theory that the donor
impliedly retained an interest in the transferred properties.
2
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useful analysis:
The inquiry into whether the taxpayer's transaction had sufficient
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes turns on both
the 'objective economic substance['] of the transactions (practical
economic consequences, other than the creation of tax benefits)
and the 'subjective business motivation' behind them (valid
business purpose or profit motive) ... These distinct aspects of the
economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a 'rigid
two-step analysis,' but rather represent related factors both of
which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had
sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be
respected for tax purposes. [Citations omitted.]
4
The Field Service Advice acknowledges the "recent"
unwillingness of the tax court to apply the economic substance
doctrine in estate and gift tax cases. 5 It notes, however, that
previous courts, including the tax court, have employed the
economic substance doctrine to determine Federal estate and
gift tax consequences. As an example, the Service points to the
decision in Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner6 where the tax
court focused on the decedent's subjective intention to minimize
estate tax by availing herself of a minority discount, and
disallowed the discount because of the tax avoidance motive
underlying the estate plan.7 The economic substance doctrine as
developed in the Service's Field Service Advice focuses on the
taxpayer's tax savings motive in structuring the estate plan:
"These cases imply that to show lack of economic substance, it is
sufficient to show that tax savings was the primary purpose, not
the sole purpose. The courts will not be confused by the
presence of peripheral incidents that are imbued with economic
substance."8 Upon showing a lack of economic substance based
on taxpayer's intent to avoid tax, the Service asserts the
transaction should be ignored for purposes of the Federal estate
and gift tax.
The Service, and those courts that have agreed with the
Service, have inappropriately imported the income tax concept
of economic substance to the Federal estate and gift tax. The
difficulty with the Service's importation of income tax notions of
4. I.R.S. FSA 2001-43-004 at 14-15 (Oct. 26, 2001), quoting ACM Partnership v.
Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 248-49, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999).
5. I.R.S. FSA 2001-43-004 at 16; I.R.S. FSA 2000-49-003 at 24.
6. Estate of Murphy v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, T.C.M. (RIA) 90472, 1990
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 (1990).
7. I.R.S. FSA 2001-43-004 at 19; I.R.S. FSA 2000-49-003 at 24-25.
8. I.R.S. FSA 2000-49-003 at 23.
3
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economic substance lies with its focus on taxpayer's tax
avoidance intentions and motives. Estate planning clients
necessarily focus on the wealth transfer tax savings of making
transfers, in addition to the donative purpose underlying the
transfer.9 To place primary emphasis on the tax savings intent
or motive of the taxpayer creates a slippery slope that leads to
the possibility of ignoring every estate planning transfer based
on the Service's notion of whether the taxpayer's primary
purpose was tax avoidance. The focus on intent unnecessarily
increases the potential for litigation with the Service.
The Service also argues for importing the income tax notion
of subjective business motivation or business purpose
underlying the transaction. But this factor is generally
inapplicable to estate planning transfers. Donative purpose,
rather than business purpose, primarily underlies estate
planning.
The Service historically has failed in its campaign to define
economic substance in the context of Federal estate and gift tax
in terms of taxpayer's intent. The United States Supreme Court
recognizes the importance of focusing on objective factors. It
rejects the notion that the determination of wealth transfer tax
hinges on the taxpayer's intent or motive. 10 Congress also
recognizes the difficulty in requiring the estate tax consequences
to turn on taxpayer's tax avoidance motives. For example,
Congress repealed the requirement that the gross estate include
"a transfer.., in contemplation of death,"" because the
requirement resulted in a fact determination as to whether the
decedent intended the transfer to be in contemplation of death.
In its place Congress enacted a bright line rule including in the
gross estate any transfer made within three years of death.
12
Objective criteria provide more certainty than subjective criteria
focusing on intent and motive.
The United States Supreme Court and the Congress
implicitly recognize the benefits of a policy encouraging estate
tax consequences to turn on objective criteria that can be relied
9. As an estate planner, it would be remiss of me not to counsel my clients
regarding the wealth transfer tax savings of making certain transfers to avoid tax.
10. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 323 (1969); Estate of Spiegel v.
Comm'r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949); Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
11. I.R.C. § 2035(a) (1976)
12. I.R.C. § 2035(a) (2002) (Section 2035 only picks up those transfers made during
the three year period ending on the date of death, if the interest transferred or power
relinquished would have been included in the gross estate under I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037,
2038 or 2042 had decedent retained the interest or power).
392 Vol. 64
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upon by taxpayers to plan their estates. The policy of providing
objective criteria minimizes the potential for costly litigation
between the Service and taxpayers, and minimizes the
enforcement burden of government. For these policy reasons, it
would be a mistake for courts to uniformly adopt the Service's
definition of economic substance, which would emphasize the tax
avoidance motive and intent of the taxpayer.
In recognition of the need for imposition of an economic
substance requirement in the determination of Federal estate
and gift tax, this article proposes a different set of criteria for
the determination of economic substance. The criteria are based
solely on objective facts as manifested by the estate plan. The
criteria derive from and follow the United States Supreme Court
decisions that enunciate a common law of Federal estate and gift
tax based on objective factors. The criteria also recognize that
the Internal Revenue Code 13 imposes estate and gift tax based
on the various property rights retained and transferred by the
taxpayer. The transfer of a valuable property right, and not just
the transfer of title to property, should trigger Federal estate
and gift tax. As a corollary, the retention of a valuable property
right by a decedent, that is transferable by decedent at death,
should cause inclusion of the value of the property right in the
decedent's gross estate. The test for economic substance
proposed by this article would tax transferred property rights
based on an objective test.
This article urges courts to adopt the following three criteria
in determining whether a specific estate planning transfer
possesses the necessary "objective" economic substance:
(1) Economic benefit criterion: Has a valuable economic
benefit been transferred (or retained) as part of the estate
planning transfer?
(2) Documentation criterion: Is the valuable economic
benefit based on an enforceable legal right provided by law or by
the estate planning documents?
(3) Implementation criterion: Do the objective actions of both
the transferor and the beneficiary implement the enforceable
legal rights, and respect the economic benefits associated with
those rights?
Each of the three criteria that form the basis of the objective
economic substance test derive from the case holdings of the
13. Hereinafter references to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended.
5
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United States Supreme Court, and the development of the
common law of the Federal estate and gift tax. This objective
economic substance test avoids the disadvantages of the intense
factual inquiry and second guessing required by the Service's
subjective intent based test of economic substance. It also
provides workable guidance for development of an estate plan
that courts should uphold.
The following discussion first develops the historic
underpinnings for application of the objective economic
substance test. Second, it develops the legal principals that
provide the foundation for the three criteria of the test. Third, it
evaluates those Federal wealth transfer tax court decisions that
have strayed from the common law as developed by the United
States Supreme Court and instead have adopted as the bell
weather the Service's subjective intent based test of economic
substance. Finally, it addresses the viability of current estate
planning techniques in light of the objective economic substance
test and the holdings of recent cases, and provides estate
planners with guidance on how to structure a viable transfer
that achieves minimization of Federal wealth transfer tax.
II. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE
From the time of enactment of the first Federal estate tax,
the taxpayer and the Service have contested issues of form
versus substance. Initially the taxpayer prevailed in the United
States Supreme Court. The Court taxed transfers based on the
form of the transfer. The Service, however, not only held the
line but eventually made substantial incursions into the Court's
initial holding that compliance with the form required by the
Code controlled the Federal estate and gift tax consequences of
the wealth transfer. The following discussion places these early
skirmishes in historical perspective.
A. FORM CONTROLS EARLY DECISIONS
Estate planners in the early part of the twentieth century
relied on technical differences in title to obtain an estate tax
savings. Planners focused on the moment when fee simple title
passed from taxpayer to the beneficiary. If fee simple title
passed prior to death, then the transfer escaped imposition of
the estate tax. This resulted in less tax because at that time in
394 Vol. 64
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history transfers during life occurred free of wealth transfer
tax.
14
The United States Supreme Court initially indicated that
the critical moment for estate tax purposes was transfer of fee
simple title. In May v. Heiner15 decedent transferred property to
a trust for the benefit of her husband during his life, then for the
benefit of herself for her life, then to her children. The court
stated:
One may freely give his property to another by absolute gift
without subjecting himself or his estate to a tax, but we are asked
to say that this statute means that he may not make a gift inter
vivos, equally absolute and complete, without subjecting it to a tax
if the gift takes the form of a life estate in one with remainder over
to another at or after the donor's death. 16
The fact that title passed during life rather than at death was
sufficient in the Court's view to exempt the transfer from estate
tax and to reject the Service's argument that decedent made the
transfer in contemplation of death. The Court in May, thus,
allowed the form of the transfer to control the estate tax
consequences.
The Court continued to focus on the form of the transfer in
Klein v. United States17 and in the St. Louis Union Trust
Company cases, Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Company'
8
and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Company.19 Fifteen months
before death the decedent in Klein transferred two parcels of
property to his wife for life and retained a reversion in fee; thus,
decedent's wife only took fee simple title if she survived
decedent. The Court concluded that decedent's death "was the
indispensable and intended event which" transferred fee simple
title to decedent's wife. 20 The Court subjected the transfer to
estate tax. In contrast, decedents in the St. Louis Trust
Company cases transferred property to their children and
14. Congress enacted the first gift tax as part of the Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L.
No. 176, 43 Stat. 253, 313-316. The gift tax was short lived and repealed in 1926 as part
of the Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 20, 44 Stat. 125. The revenue needs created by
the Great Depression caused Congress to reenact the gift tax as part of the Revenue Act
of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, 47 Stat. 169, 245.
15. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), overruled by Comm'r v. Estate of Church,
335 U.S. 632 (1949).
16. Id. at 244. (The Court quoted from its earlier decision in Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929)).
17. 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
18. 296 U.S. 39 (1935), overruled by Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
19. 296 U.S. 48 (1935), overruled by Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
20. Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 234 (1931).
7
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retained only a possibility of reverter. The Court concluded that
fee simple title passed at the time of the transfer to the children
and not at death. The court found "death simply put an end to
what, at best, was a mere possibility of a reverter by
extinguishing it; that is to say, by converting what was merely
possible into an utter impossibility."2' The transfers were not
subject to estate tax. In Klein and in the St. Louis Union Trust
Company, the Court arrived at two different estate tax results
based on the form of the transaction, despite the similarity of
the economic benefit retained by the decedent.
B. OPPOSITE HOLDINGS WITH RESPECT TO
ECONOMICALLY SIMILAR TRANSFERS RESULT IN
EVENTUAL FOCUS ON ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
The opportunity to revisit the holdings of Klein and the St.
Louis Union Trust Company cases arose in Helvering v.
Hallock.22 Decedent in Hallock transferred property during life
and retained an interest in the form of a possibility of reverter.
Retention of an interest in that form as opposed to a remainder
in fee avoided imposition of estate tax pursuant to the holdings
of the St. Louis Union Trust Company cases. The previous
emphasis on form did not sit well with the Hallock Court.
The Hallock Court noted that no longer "does the issue turn
on the unglossed text" of the statute.23 The Court declined to
recognize differences in the language of conveyance of title and
departed from its previous reliance on form. The Court focused
on substance: "In determining whether a taxable transfer
becomes complete only at death we look to substance, not to
form.... However we label the device it is but a means by
which the gift is rendered incomplete until the donor's death."
24
The Court specifically disregarded the form of the retained
interest, whether that of a remainder in fee or a possibility of
reverter. It stated:
The importation of these distinctions and controversies from the
law of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes
a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the same interests,
judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable or not,
depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have
their historic justification but possess no relevance for tax
21. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 43 (1935).
22. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
23. Id. at 110.
24. Id. at 114.
396 Vol. 64
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purposes.
25
The Court justified its departure from the St. Louis Union Trust
Co. cases on the basis that it should not "persevere in
distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on
further examination, appear consonant neither with the
purposes of the statute nor with this Court's own conception of
it." 26 The Court, thus, held the property includible in decedent's
gross estate.
27
The United States Supreme Court recognized that a
continued focus on form of the transfer would result in
anomalous results. The estate planner would simply need to
call an interest by a different name in order to achieve estate tax
savings. The Hallock Court clarified the need to subject
economically similar transfers to the same estate tax burdens.
In a final death blow to the notion that form and not economic
substance controls the estate tax consequences of a transfer, the
United States Supreme Court overruled May v. Heiner.28 In
Commissioner v. Church's Estate,29 the Court extended the
reasoning of Hallock: "And under the teaching of the Hallock case,
quite in contrast to that of May v. Heiner, passage of the mere
technical legal title to a trustee is not necessarily crucial in
determining whether and when a gift becomes complete for estate
tax purposes. Looking to substance and not merely to form, as we
must unless we depart from the teaching of Hallock, the
inescapable fact is that [decedent] retained for himself until death
a most valuable property right in these stocks-the right to get
and to spend their income."
30
The Court held in Church's Estate that decedent's gross
estate included the value of a trust in which decedent had
25. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 122.
27. In a later case, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108
(1945), the Court held that the full value of the property transferred during life was
includible in the gross estate. It stated:
"The taxable gross estate, in other words, must include those property interests
the ultimate possession or enjoyment of which is held in suspense until the
moment of the grantor's death or thereafter. [] Tested by that standard, the
entire corpus of the trust should have been included in the decedent's gross
estate and an estate tax levied on its net value at the date of decedent's death.
The ultimate disposition of all the trust property was suspended during the life
of the decedent."
Id. at 510. The Court again focused on the point in time at which the transfer of the
economic benefit became final.
28. 281 U.S. 238 (1930), overruled by Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632
(1949).
29. 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
30. Id. at 644-645.
397
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retained an income interest. It focused on retained economic
benefit of the taxpayer, stating:
"For from the viewpoint of the grantor the significant effect of this
transaction was his continued enjoyment and retention of the
income until his death; the important consequence to the
remaindermen was the postponement of their right to this
enjoyment of the income until the grantor's death."
3 1
The focus on retained economic benefit originates in the
requirements of the Code.32
Prior to its holding in Hallock, the Court in Burnet v.
Guggenheim33 had already focused on economic substance of the
transfer in the context of the gift tax. During 1917, the taxpayer
in Guggenheim transferred property in trust while reserving a
power of revocation. Congress then enacted a gift tax as part of
the Revenue Act of 1924. 34 In 1925 taxpayer canceled the power
of revocation in an attempt to avoid application of the newly
enacted gift tax. Taxpayer argued that he made a transfer for
gift tax purposes when he transferred title to the trust in 1917,
and the cancellation of the power to revoke was not a transfer
contemplated by the gift tax statute. The court looked not to
passage of title but to the economic substance of the transaction.
'Taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as
it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual
benefit for which the tax is paid.' Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 327;
[other citations omitted]. While the power of revocation stood
uncancelled in the deeds, the gifts, from the point of view of
substance, were inchoate and imperfect.... [The trusts] acquired
substance and reality for the first time in July, 1925, when the
deed became absolute through the cancellation of the power.
35
The Court recognized that retention of command over the
property allows control over enjoyment of the economic benefits
afforded by the transferred property.
The holding of Guggenheim was consonant with the earlier
holding of the Court in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company,36
an estate tax case. Decedent in Northern Trust Company
transferred property to two trusts with respect to which he alone
reserved a power of revocation, and also transferred property to
31. Id. at 641.
32. See e.g., I.R.C. § 2036.
33. 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
34. The gift tax enacted in 1924 was repealed in 1926 and not replaced until 1932.
See Revenue Act of 1924, supra note 14.
35. 288 U.S. at 283-84.
36. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
Vol. 64
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five trusts with respect to which he reserved a power of
revocation only with the consent of the trust beneficiaries. The
Court included the two trusts as part of decedent's gross estate
and excluded the five trusts based on an analysis of decedent's
economic control over trust property. It noted:
Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trusts save to
decedent any control over the economic benefits or the enjoyment
of the property.... The shifting of the economic interest in the
trust property which was the subject of the tax was thus complete
as soon as the trust was made. His power to recall the property
and of control over it for his own benefit then ceased .... 37
The holding emphasized that estate tax consequences depend
upon the shifting of economic benefit from the transferor to the
beneficiary. The Court shifted its focus from form to economic
benefit. Transfer of economic benefit now determines Federal
estate and gift tax consequences.
C. CONGRESS ALSO SHIFTED FOCUS TO ECONOMIC
BENEFITS CONFERRED BY RIGHTS TO USE PROPERTY
Congress reacted to the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court by amending the Federal estate and gift tax
Code. Initially the Code defined the Federal estate and gift tax
base to include (i) property subject to payment of creditors
claims at death and (ii) property transferred in contemplation of
death or transfer intended to take effect at death.38 The Court's
interpretation of these provisions allowed the form of the
transaction to drive the tax consequences. Congress determined
that the revenue cost of this interpretation was simply too great,
and took steps to legislatively reverse the holdings of the United
37. Id. at 346-47.
38. The 1916 estate tax Code included in the gross estate:
"the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated: (a) To the extent of the interest therein of the
decedent at the time of his death which after his death is subject to the
payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its
administration and is subject to distribution as part of his estate. (b) To the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer, or with respect to which he has created a trust, in contemplation of or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, except
in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money or money's worth.
Any transfer of a material part of his property in the nature of a final
disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent within two years prior
to his death without such a consideration, shall, unless shown to the contrary,
be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of
this title..."
Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, 39 Stat. 756, 777 (1916).
399
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States Supreme Court. In 1931, Congress amended the Code
and it subjected to tax those property rights that confer
economic benefit.
39
In Commissioner v. Church's Estate,40 the United States
Supreme Court traced the history of the 1931 amendment to the
Federal estate and gift tax Code:
March 3, 1931, the next day after the three per curiam opinions
were rendered, Acting Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills
wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House explaining the holdings
in May v. Heiner and the three cases decided the day before. He
pointed out the disastrous effects they would have on the estate
tax law and urged that Congress 'in order to prevent tax evasion,'
immediately 'correct the situation' brought about by May v. Heiner
and the other cases. 74 Cong. Rec. 7198, 7199 (1931). He
expressed fear that without such action the Government would
suffer 'a loss in excess of one-third of the revenue derived from the
federal estate tax, with anticipated refunds of in excess of
$25,000,000.' The Secretary's surprise at the decisions and his
apprehensions as to their tax evasion consequences were repeated
on the floor of the House and Senate. 74 Cong. Rec. supra.
Senator Smoot, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, said
on the floor of the Senate that this judicial interpretation of the
statute 'came almost like a bombshell, because nobody ever
anticipated such a decision.' 74 Cong. Rec. 7078. Both houses of
Congress unanimously passed and the president signed the
requested resolution that same day.
41
The Code as it now exists incorporates the changes made by
Congress in 1931. The Code taxes economic benefit conferred by
rights and powers to property that together determine
possession or enjoyment of the property transferred. If a
transferor retains the right to income from the property, the
right to time distribution of income or principal, the right to a
reversionary interest in the transferred property or the right to
alter, amend, revoke or terminate possession or enjoyment of
39. By 1932 Congress had amended the estate tax Code to include in the gross
estate:
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by
trust or otherwise,.. . under which he has retained for his life or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the
income from, the property, or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
Joint Resolution to Amend Section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 46 Stat. 1516 - 1517
(1931).
40. 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
41. Id. at 639-640.
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property, then the property transferred is included in
transferor's gross estate.42 Each of the rights and powers taxed
are valuable economic benefits. Retention of any of the
enumerated economic benefits by the transferor appropriately
triggers Federal estate tax.
III. EMERGENCE OF THE OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE TEST
From these initial clashes between the taxpayer and the
Service and the Congressional response to those clashes, the
objective economic substance test emerged. The United States
Supreme Court has developed a common law of Federal estate
and gift tax that focuses on the objective economic substance of a
wealth transfer. The common law as traceable through the
Court's pronouncements employs the three criteria of the
objective economic substance test to define the substance over
form doctrine in the area of Federal estate and gift tax. The
following discussion focuses on the development of the three
criteria: economic benefit, documentation and implementation.
A. ECONOMIC BENEFIT CRITERION: HAS A VALUABLE
ECONOMIC BENEFIT BEEN TRANSFERRED (OR
RETAINED) AS PART OF THE ESTATE PLANNING
TRANSFER?
The United States Supreme Court insists on applying the
Federal estate and gift tax Code in a manner that reaches all
transfers of valuable economic benefit. Consonant with the
Code provisions, it emphasizes taxing based on the value
associated with the right to use or control property. This focus
on economic benefits conferred by the various rights associated
with the use or control of property forms the basis of the
economic benefit criterion, which asks: Has a valuable economic
benefit been transferred (or retained) as part of the estate
planning transfer?
1. Interpretation of "Transfer" with Focus on Economic Benefit
The United States Supreme Court now broadly interprets
the reach of the federal estate and gift tax Code based on the
42. I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037, 2038 (2002).
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statutory definition of "transfer."43 The gift tax applies "whether
the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or
indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible
or intangible. .. ,,44 The language of the estate tax Code is
equally as broad. The gross estate includes "the value at the
time of [ death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated."45
In Smith v. Shaughnessy46 the Court rejected taxpayer's
argument that the gift tax did not reach transfer of a
"contingent" remainder interest. The court found:
The language of the gift tax statute... is broad enough to include
property, however conceptual or contingent. And lest there be any
doubt as to the amplitude of their purpose, the Senate and House
Committees, reporting the bill, spelled out their meaning as
follows: "The terms 'property,' 'transfer,' 'gift,' and 'indirectly'...
are used in the broadest sense; the term 'property' reaching every
species of right or interest protected by the laws and having an
exchangeable value."
4 7
The Court broadly construed transfers of property subject to the
gift tax, despite the possibility that the same transfer of
property could be subject to estate tax in the donor's estate.48
In a later case, Dickman v. Commissioner,49 the Supreme
Court reiterated its adherence to the principle that the gift tax
Code applies to transfers of value, in whatever form. Taxpayers
in Dickman made substantial interest free demand loans to
their children. The Court agreed with the Commissioner that
use of money at no charge constituted a gift to the extent of the
value of the use of the loaned funds. The right to use loaned
money confers an economic benefit. The Court concluded that
the gift tax "was designed to encompass all transfers of property
and property rights having significant value."50 The Court
rejected taxpayer's argument, based on the form of the
transaction, that no gift occurred because taxpayer's children
were obligated to return the loaned funds on demand.51
43. See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
44. I.R.C. § 2511(a)(2002).
45. I.R.C. § 2031(a)(2002).
46. 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943).
47. Id. at 180.
48. The Court noted the federal estate tax provides for the possibility of a credit for
gift tax paid.
49. 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
50. Id. at 348-349.
51. Congress responded by enactment of I.R.C. § 7872 that provides a method for
determining the value of any gift that results from a below market interest loan, and
402 Vol. 64
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Courts have extended this focus on transfers of rights
conferring economic benefit beyond the facts of Dickman. For
example, some courts hold that a transfer of property in
exchange for an installment note with a present value less than
that of the property transferred results in a gift for transfer tax
purposes, regardless of whether safe harbor interest rules
applicable to income taxation have been met by the terms of the
note.52 The Service has been eager to embrace this broad
interpretation of economic benefit, as well. In a private letter
ruling that it later withdrew, the Service ruled that a parent's
personal guarantee of a bank loan to child for which there was
no security constituted a gift.53 Although never officially stated,
the Service's withdrawal of its ruling likely stemmed from the
difficulty of valuing the guarantee. These examples demonstrate
the willingness of the courts, and the Service, to subject to
wealth transfer tax even the most intangible of economic
benefits conferred by the transfer of rights associated with
property.
Courts are loath to limit the definition of property. The
Fifth Circuit has noted that "we must remind ourselves that
'property' is an expansionist term."54 In light of the broad
definition of property transfers, application of the Federal estate
and gift tax based on economic benefit associated with a
valuable property right may be limited only by the inability of
the Service and the courts to arrive at a definitive value, and
even the inability to value the asset may not prevent application
of estate or gift tax. The United States Supreme Court stated:
"Even though these concepts of property and value may be
slippery and elusive they can not escape taxation so long as they
are used in the world of business."
55
further provides for certain de minimus exceptions to the general rule that such a loan
constitutes a gift.
52. Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995); Krabbenhoft v.
Comm'r, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991). But see, Ballard v. Comm'r, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1988) (held no gift if safeharbor interest rules per applicable income tax statute met).
53. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-13-009 (Dec. 21, 1990), withdrawn by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-09-
018 (Dec. 1, 1993). The initial ruling did not indicate how to arrive at the value of the
guarantee for purposes of applying the estate and gift tax.
54. First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980)
(held that a production right granted pursuant to a government crop control program fell
within the definition of property because it was subject to transfer).
55. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943). The Court in Smith held that
inter vivos transfer of a contingent remainder interest was subject to gift tax and
rejected the taxpayer's argument "that no realistic value can be placed on the contingent
remainder and that it therefore should not be classed as a gift." Id. Congress, of course,
15
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2. The Reciprocal Trust Doctrine Focus on Economic Benefit
The United States Supreme Court extended the holdings
that the economic benefit conferred by a transfer, as opposed to
its form, should control estate tax consequences to the situation
where taxpayers create reciprocal trusts. In United States v.
Estate of Grace,56 a husband and wife, in anticipation of
enactment of a gift tax, created reciprocal trusts: Joseph Grace
created a trust naming himself as co-trustee and his wife Janet
as life beneficiary, and Janet, in turn, created a trust naming
herself as co-trustee and Joseph as life beneficiary. 57 The Court
found the trusts were interrelated because the trusts were
governed by substantially identical terms and were created at
about the same time.58 By their literal terms neither trust
would have been included in the estates of Joseph and Janet
Grace because neither of them retained any prohibited economic
benefits in the trust of which they were trustor.59 The Court
applied the reciprocal trust doctrine to this planning technique
"which seemingly avoid[s] the literal terms of [the taxing
statute] while still leaving the decedent the lifetime enjoyment
of his property."
60
The Court uncrossed the trusts. It included in Joseph's
gross estate the trust of which he was a beneficiary. The Court
rejected a requirement that the trusts be established in
consideration for the other.61 It held that the trusts need only be
"interrelated, and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual
value, leave the settlors in approximately the same economic
position as they would have been in had they created trusts
naming themselves as life beneficiaries." 62  The form of the
transaction did not matter. The Court focused only on economic
benefit objectively conferred:
later responded by enactment of I.R.C. § 7520 (2002). Treasury promulgated regulations
thereunder that provide a formula for determining the value of a contingent remainder.
56. 395 U.S. 316 (1969). The Court noted that several lower courts had already
employed the reciprocal trust doctrine. Id. at 321.
57. During their marriage, Joseph transferred securities and real property to
Janet. Janet used this property to fund the trust for her husband. Id. at 319.
58. Id. at 325.
59. I.R.C. §§ 2036 and 2038 only apply when the transferor of the property retains
a prohibited economic benefit with respect to the property.
60. 395 U.S. at 320. The lower courts had employed the reciprocal trust doctrine
in numerous cases. The United States Supreme Court employed the doctrine for the
first time in Grace. Id.
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It is also clear that the transfers in trust left each party, to the
extent of mutual value, in the same objective economic position as
before. Indeed, it appears, as would be expected in transfers
between husband and wife, that the effective position of each party
vis-A-vis the property did not change at all. It is no answer that
the transferred properties were different in character. For
purposes of the estate tax, we think that economic value is the
only workable criterion.
63
Essentially Joseph and Janet Grace retained enforceable
legal rights to the same value of property as before creation of
the trusts and, thus, were left in substantially the same
financial position. The lack of substantive economic change
persuaded the Court to require the property held in trust for
their benefit be subject to estate tax.
The Sixth Circuit in Green v. United States64 narrowly
applied the holding of Grace. In Green, Jack Green created a
trust for the benefit of his granddaughter Jennifer and named
his wife Norma trustee; Norma, in turn, created a trust for the
benefit of their granddaughter Greer and named her husband
Jack trustee. Both trusts allowed trustee discretion to reinvest
and time the distributions of corpus and income, discretion that
if it had been retained by each of them as trustor would have
caused inclusion of the trust assets in their respective gross
estates. The court declined to apply the reciprocal trust doctrine
to include the trust for the benefit of Greer in Jack's estate
because Jack was not trustor of Greer's trust and because it
found that neither Jack nor Norma were left in the same
economic position because each had given property away to a
grandchild.
Other courts have not arrived at the same conclusion as the
Sixth Circuit in Green. The tax court in Bischoff v.
Commissioner65 applied the reciprocal trust doctrine to facts
similar to those involved in Green. The tax court in Bischoff
employed a two part analysis: (1) whether the transfers are
interrelated and (2) whether benefits or powers retained would
have been taxed absent the reciprocal technique. Both parts of
the analysis focus on objective criteria. The tax court found that
application of the reciprocal trust doctrine to reciprocal trusts
with retained income interests but not to reciprocal trusts with
retained powers over timing of distributions would create a
63. Id. at 325.
64. 68 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1995).
65. 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
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perceived loophole. 66 The Federal Circuit court in Exchange
Bank and Trust Company of Florida v. United States67 followed
the tax court's reasoning in Bischoff where spouses created
reciprocal custodial accounts pursuant to the Florida Gifts to
Minors Act for their children.
The reasoning of the tax court and of the Federal Circuit
court is persuasive. The estate tax Code includes within the
definition of taxable economic benefit the power to control the
flow of income from transferred property.68 The Seventh Circuit
in its decision essentially ignored the broad scope of the taxing
statute. Its holding allows form to control the tax consequences
of the transaction, a notion previously rejected by the United
States Supreme Court. The grandparents in Green, by using
reciprocal trusts, were able to retain an economic benefit that
with respect to any direct gift from grandparent to grandchild
would have caused inclusion of the transferred property in the
respective grandparent's estate. The Seventh Circuit allowed
form of the transaction to undermine the purpose of the Code
sections at issue.69 Such a holding departs from the principle
developed in United States Supreme Court decisions, including
Grace, that economic value and the economic benefit conferred
as defined by the estate tax Code is the only "workable
criterion."7
0
The United States Supreme Court in Grace and the lower
courts in Bischoff and Exchange Bank and Trust Company of
Florida demonstrate a willingness to view interrelated
transactions as one for purposes of determining economic
substance of the estate planning technique. Reciprocal trust
decisions turn on the objective facts indicating the trusts "were
part of a single transaction designed and carried out by
66. Id. at 48.
67. 694 F.2d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
68. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2002).
69. Greene v. United States, 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956). The Seventh Circuit
holding in Green literally applied Section 2036 of the Code based on form of the
transaction. Neither Jack Green nor Norma Green retained rights as transferor over the
trusts to which they were named trustee. Taken literally, Section 2036 will not apply to
include trust assets in the gross estate unless the transferor retains a prohibited power
over the trust assets. Were the tax court or the Federal Circuit to address the facts in
Green, those courts instead would have traced the economic benefits retained by Jack
and Norma to the trusts with respect to which they were named trustee, uncrossed the
transfers, and applied Section 2036 of the Code to include a portion of each trust in their
respective gross estates.
70. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. at 325.
406 Vol. 64
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decedent."71 Those objective facts include the timing of the
transfers, the amount of the transfers, and the actual economic
benefit to each of the parties involved. Recent crossed gift
decisions use an objective analysis of the resulting economic
positions of the parties.72 Those decisions refrain from using an
analysis based on the taxpayer's intent or tax avoidance
motive. 73 The United States Supreme Court has cited with
approval cases that take "an inclusive view of the whole
arrangement."
74
B. DOCUMENTATION CRITERION: IS THE VALUABLE
ECONOMIC BENEFIT BASED ON EITHER AN
ENFORCEABLE LEGAL RIGHT PROVIDED BY LAW OR BY
THE ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS?
The United States Supreme Court decisions also clearly
enunciate the rule that a transfer confers an economic benefit
only to the extent that the beneficiary possesses enforceable
legal rights to enjoy the economic benefit. This focus on
enforceable legal rights provides an objective analysis. It rejects
any analysis based on a taxpayer's intent or motive in making
the transfer to confer the economic benefit. Once it is
established that an economic benefit is the subject of the
transfer, the documentation criterion becomes the focus: Is the
valuable economic benefit based on an enforceable legal right
provided either by law or by the estate planning documents? To
answer this question, courts continue to employ the principal
that objective economic substance should control tax
consequences and not form.
The United States Supreme Court developed this criterion
in Commissioner v. Noel.75 In that case, decedent purchased
accidental death life insurance prior to boarding a plane. He
71. Id.
72. Compare Sather v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 1168, 1175 (8th Cir. 2001) (Brothers
made crossed-gifts to nieces and nephews on the same day); and Estate of Schuler v.
Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 934, T.C.M. (RIA) 54171, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 465
(2000), affd 282 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2002) (Brothers made crossed-gifts to nieces and
nephews that did not accomplish the stated business purpose of the transaction, which
was to place the separate family businesses under the exclusive control of one brother's
family), with Schultz v. United States, 493 F.2d 1225, 1226 (4th Cir. 1974)(court
unnecessarily focused on actual intent, and indicated it need not reach the analysis of
the Court in Grace which indicated that "'actual intent' was 'immaterial'")
73. Supra note 72.
74. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 148 (1972).
75. 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
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asked the sales clerk to give the policies to his wife and said:
"They are hers now, I no longer have anything to do with
them."76 Decedent's plane crashed and his wife received the
proceeds. She asserted that decedent made a gift of the policies
to her at the airport and thereafter retained no incidents of
ownership over the policies. 77  The Court focused not on
decedent's intent to make a gift but instead on the legal rights
as set forth in the insurance contract. 78 The contract terms
prohibited assignment or transfer without a written
endorsement of the policy. Decedent was unable to make the
assignment by written endorsement before boarding the plane.
Up until the moment of death, decedent retained incidents of
ownership over the policy under the legally enforceable terms of
the policy because decedent failed to comply with the contract
requirement that an assignment or transfer of the policy be
made by written endorsement. An oral transfer was insufficient
in substance, and for that matter, in form to divest decedent of
economic benefit. The only legally enforceable way to transfer
ownership of the life insurance policy was to deliver a written
endorsement, and that was not done. The gross estate of
decedent, thus, included the value of the policy proceeds.
In a later case, United States v. Byrum, 79 the Court focused
on the legally enforceable power of decedent who transferred
stock of closely held corporations and retained the right to vote
the stock. Retention of such right, combined with stock owned
outright by donor, afforded him voting control of the
corporations at issue. The Service asserted that retention of the
right to vote was tantamount to retention of a right to control
distribution of income because decedent could determine the
composition of the board of directors that in turn voted on
whether to declare a dividend.80  The Court rejected the
Service's argument.
The Byrum Court found that decedent did not reserve the
right to determine timing of the distribution of income.8' It
76. Id. at 680.
77. Id. at 679; See also I.R.C. § 2042 (2002), which includes in the gross estate the
value of proceeds of an insurance policy over which decedent retained incidents of
ownership. Incidents of ownership refers to the right to impact receipt of the economic
benefits of the life insurance policy. The owner of the policy generally holds the
incidents of ownership.
78. 380 U.S. at 682-684.
79. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
80. Id. at 131.
81. Id. See also I.R.C. § 2036 (2002). Retention of such a right would have caused
408 Vol. 64
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stated:
The term 'right,' certainly when used in a tax statute, must be
given its normal and customary meaning. It connotes an
ascertainable and legally enforceable power .... Here, the right
ascribed to Byrum was the power to use his majority position and
influence over the corporate directors to "regulate the flow of
dividends" to the trust. That "right" was neither ascertainable nor
legally enforceable and hence was not a right in any normal sense
of that term.
Byrum did retain the legal right to vote shares held by the trust
and to veto investments and reinvestments. But the corporate
trustee alone, not Byrum, had the right to pay out or withhold
income and thereby to designate who among the beneficiaries
enjoyed such income. Whatever power Byrum may have possessed
with respect to the flow of income into the trust was derived not
from an enforceable legal right specified in the trust instrument,
but from the fact that he could elect a majority of the directors of
the three corporations.
8 2
The Court recognized that state law vested control over
payment of corporate dividends in the board of directors.8 3 The
board is subject to fiduciary duties regarding payment of
dividends.8 4 Byrum himself, as a majority shareholder, owed a
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders regarding operation of
the corporation.8 5 In addition, Byrum transferred the shares to
a corporate trustee who alone controlled distribution of income
from the shares held in trust. Because Byrum did not retain the
legally enforceable right to control the flow of income under the
terms of the trust agreement or applicable fiduciary duties, he
did not retain a right that would cause inclusion under the
estate tax provisions of the Code.8 6
inclusion in the gross estate of decedent under Section 2036 of the Code.
82. 408 U.S. at 136-37. The Court emphasized that corporate directors were
subject to a fiduciary duty to act in the interests of the corporation.
83. 408 U.S. at 141-42
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Congress responded to the Court's holding in Byrum by enacting Section
2036(b) of the Code, known as the anti-Byrum amendment. Enactment of Section
2036(b) legislatively reversed the Court's holding in Byrum. Specifically, in the event
decedent transfers stock and retains the right to vote the stock of a controlled
corporation, the stock is includable in the gross estate. However, if decedent does not
retain the right to vote the transferred stock, there is no inclusion even though decedent
retains control of the corporation. The Senate Committee Report explains: " The rule
would not apply to the transfer of stock in a controlled corporation where the decedent
could not vote the transferred stock. For example, where a decedent transfers stock in a
controlled corporation to his son and does not have the power to vote the stock. . ., the
rule does not apply even where the decedent owned, or could vote, a majority of the
stock. Similarly, where the decedent owned both voting and non-voting stock and
21
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In both Noel and Byrum the United States Supreme Court
analyzed the substantive legal rights retained by decedent in
the contract or the trust document at issue to determine
whether decedent retained economic benefit from the
transferred property. Substance of the transaction, thus,
depended on the objective enforceable terms of the governing
agreement. It could be argued that at this point substance and
form merge. The economic substance of the transaction draws
definition from the form of the underlying contract. Yet at the
same time, if transferor may not legally avail herself of an
economic benefit, it would be inappropriate to ignore the
substantive legal rights and infer a retention of economic benefit
based on intent of the taxpayer. The opinions of the United
States Supreme Court are in agreement. When faced with
similar issues the circuit courts of appeal apply the same
analysis.
The Sixth Circuit in Estate of Sulovich v. Commissioner,
8 7
held that the physical handing over of a passbook savings
account without a corresponding change to the underlying
contract with the bank was insufficient to avoid inclusion of the
value of the account in decedent's gross estate. The court looked
to whether decedent could retain control of the savings account
pursuant to the terms of the legally enforceable contract with
the bank. The savings account contract with the bank indicated
that transfer could only be achieved by entering into a written
contract changing ownership of the savings account. The
physical handing over of the passbook did not meet the legal
requirements of the contract. The court referred to the facts as
"a situation where the substance of the transfer, and not the
form, must control."88  The economic substance of the
transaction depended on the legally enforceable rights of the
decedent pursuant to the contract governing the bank account.
The holding of the Ninth Circuit in Crummey v.
Commissioner,8 9 also focused on the legally enforceable rights of
the trust beneficiaries to withdraw amounts from a trust. At
transferred the non-voting stock to another person, the rule does not apply to the non-
voting stock simply because of the decedent's ownership of the voting stock." Senate
Committee Report on Revenue Act of 1978, P.L. 95-600. See also, Prop. Treas. Reg. §
20.2036-2(a). Given this application, the anti-Byrum amendment does not impact the
Supreme Court's analysis of fiduciary duty as set forth in Byrum.
87. 587 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1978).
88. Id. at 850.
89. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
410 Vol. 64
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issue was the ability of a donor to take an annual gift tax
exclusion for gifts made in trust for the benefit of four children,
three of which were minor beneficiaries. The trust terms
specifically allowed the children to withdraw up to the annual
exclusion amount transferred to the trust. If a beneficiary was a
minor, the child's guardian could exercise the power of
withdrawal on behalf of the minor. The Service allowed the
annual exclusion gifts for transfers made subject to the
withdrawal right of the adult beneficiary. The Service asserted
the transfers subject to the withdrawal rights of the minor
beneficiaries were future interests not eligible for the annual
exclusion because it was unlikely that the demand right would
be exercised on behalf of the minors. The Ninth Circuit rejected
the Service's argument. The court noted that "the important
thing was the right to enjoy rather than the actual enjoyment of
the property."90 The court concluded that as a technical matter
the minor could legally enforce the withdrawal right by
requiring appointment of a guardian. The court determined "all
that is necessary is to find that the demand could not be
resisted."91
The doctrine that substance and not form should control tax
consequences, thus, has evolved in the estate planning context
to mean that objective economic substance should control:
legally enforceable rights to the economic benefit provides the
basis of Federal estate and gift taxation. Legal enforceability
derives both from enforceable terms of an agreement and from
rights implied by law.
The emphasis of the United States Supreme Court decisions
on objective economic substance derives from the Code, itself.
The estate and gift tax provisions of the Code apply based on
retained and transferred economic benefits, such as the right to
receive or control distribution of income and other property
rights.92 It follows that to the extent the decedent retains a
legally enforceable right to the economic benefits associated with
the transferred property, the property should be included in
decedent's gross estate. It follows, as well, that to the extent a
donor transfers legally enforceable rights to the economic
90. Id. at 85.
91. Id. at 88.
92. The United States Supreme Court indicated: "More than once recently we have
emphasized that "enjoyment" or "enjoy," as used in these and similar statutes, are not
terms of art, but connote substantial present economic benefit rather than technical
vesting of title or estates." Comm'r v. Holmes' Estate, 326 U.S. 480, 486 (1946).
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benefits associated with the transferred property, the transfer
should be included in the donor's taxable gifts.
C. IMPLEMENTATION CRITERION: DO THE ACTIONS OF
BOTH THE TRANSFEROR AND THE BENEFICIARY
IMPLEMENT THE ENFORCEABLE LEGAL RIGHTS, AND
RESPECT THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH
THOSE RIGHTS?
The third criterion addressing implementation of the estate
planning transfer has been developed primarily in the lower
courts. Those courts have taken into account the emphasis the
United States Supreme Court places on the transfer of economic
benefits subject to legally enforceable rights. The
implementation criterion asks: Do the actions of both the
transferor and the beneficiary implement the enforceable legal
rights, and respect the economic benefits associated with those
rights? In other words, the parties must act in accordance with
the legally enforceable rights transferred. To the extent that the
objective manifestations and actions of the parties ignore or fail
to implement the legally enforceable rights, courts imply an
agreement between the transferor and the beneficiary. The
courts re-characterize the transfer based on the objective
manifestations of the parties. If the objective manifestations of
the transferor and beneficiary allow the transferor to enjoy the
economic benefits of the property despite a purported transfer,
the courts will tax the property based on the retention of those
benefits by the transferor.
Courts may imply an agreement between the transferor and
the beneficiary that, after the gift, the transferor will retain
certain benefits from the transferred property, even though the
form of the transfer and substantive legal rights thereunder
would not allow any such retention. Courts generally imply
such an agreement where the transferor either neglects to follow
the form of the transaction or ignores the substantive legal
rights of the beneficiary. This analysis ensures that taxpayers
objectively respect the economic substance of the transaction as
required by the form of the transaction, and its associated
legally enforceable rights.
The tax court found an implied agreement between the
donor and beneficiaries in Estate of Schauerhamer v.
412 Vol. 64
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Commissioner.93 Mrs. Schauerhamer transferred her assets to a
family limited partnership and, in turn, transferred limited
partnership interests to her children. 94 As general partner, Mrs.
Schauerhamer proceeded to deposit partnership income in her
personal account and in effect ignored the terms of the
partnership and the legal rights of the limited partners to a
proportional amount of the partnership income. The court
included the transferred interests in Mrs. Schauerhamer's gross
estate.95 Despite the fact that the form of the transaction and
the enforceable legal rights of the partners would preclude a
retention of income from the gifted limited partnership interests
by Mrs. Schauerhamer, the tax court found an implied
agreement on the part of taxpayer and her children that she
would retain the income from the transferred limited
partnership interests because, after the gift of the limited
partnership interests, Mrs. Schauerhamer in fact retained the
income.96 She failed to meet the implementation criterion. The
court essentially re-characterized the transaction to recognize
the actual retention of an economic benefit by Mrs.
Schauerhamer. 9
7
In an earlier case, Estate of Guynn v. United States,98 the
Fourth Circuit similarly employed the analysis required by the
third criterion. In that case, Mom purchased a home,
transferred the home by gift to her daughter and filed a gift tax
return with respect to the transfer. Her daughter, who was also
named personal representative of Mom's estate, argued that the
home should not be included in Mom's gross estate. The Fourth
93. Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo
LEXIS 276 (1997).
94. This estate planning technique purportedly allows the donor to retain some
control over transferred assets as general partner. It also allows donor to transfer assets
at a reduced value due to the minority position of a limited partner.
95. The court included the transferred partnership interests in donor's gross estate
under Section 2036 of the Code.
96. Section 2036 of the Code requires inclusion in the gross estate of property over
which the donor-decedent retained an income interest. See also Thompson v. Comm'r,
84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, T.C.M. (RIA) 54890, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 254 (2002); Estate
of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, T.C.M. (RIA) 54745, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo
LEXIS 127 (2002); Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi III), T.C. Memo. 2003-145, 2003
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 144 (2003).
97. If Mrs. Schauerhamer, in her position as general partner, had made
partnership distributions to herself and her children based on the proportional interest
of each of the partners, the gifts made by Mrs. Schauerhamer would have achieved the
intended wealth transfer tax savings. Distributions based on proportional interest
would have implemented the enforceable legal rights of the beneficiary limited partners.
98. 437 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1971).
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Circuit rejected the daughter's argument. It emphasized the
failure of Mom and her daughter to respect the enforceable legal
rights associated with ownership of property. The court traced
the events following the gift: Mom continued to reside in the
transferred home as its sole occupant; Mom continued to pay for
improvements and property taxes; and, the daughter did not pay
for upkeep of the home nor did she receive any rent from Mom.99
Based on these objective acts, the court implied an agreement
that Mom would retain economic benefits to the home
purportedly transferred to the daughter. The court found:
Consistent with this mutual assumption, [Mom] retained all the
attributes of ownership except bare legal title.... From every
outward indication, [Mom's] relationship to the property was no
different after the transfer to her daughter than before.
Conversely, [daughter's] possession and economic enjoyment of the
property was totally postponed until her mother's death. We hold,
therefore, that the testimony of [daughter] and the actions of the
parties establish an implied understanding that [Mom] would
retain the possession and enjoyment of the property .... 100
The court looked to the objective circumstances following the
gift. Mom and daughter ignored daughter's substantive legal
rights to receive rental payments from the home. Based on the
objective economic substance of the transaction, the court
included the home in Mom's gross estate.101
Enforcement of legal rights associated with economic
benefits of the transferred property results in the court
upholding the gift. In Estate of Barlow v. Commissioner,10 2
decedent transferred the family farm to his three children and
simultaneously entered into a lease for fair rental value with the
children. The children could terminate the lease if rent was not
timely paid. In deciding whether decedent and children
impliedly agreed to allow decedent a retained interest in the
farm at the time of the transfer, the court reviewed the objective
events occurring after the transfer. 0 3 Although decedent failed
99. Id. at 1149.
100. Id. at 1150.
101. Id. The court included the home in the gross estate pursuant to Section 2036
of the Code.
102. 55 T.C. 666 (1971).
103. The tax court noted:
This substance-versus-form argument, while theoretically plausible, depends
upon the facts, and we do not think the record as a whole contains the facts
required to give it life-to show that decedent retained possession or
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to pay rent under the lease, the court found such failure could be
explained by the fact that one child suffered from alcoholism and
another was in the midst of a divorce. On decedent's death, the
court highlighted the fact that the children filed a claim against
decedent's estate for the unpaid rent. In contrast to the facts of
Guynn, the beneficiaries in Barlow took steps to legally enforce
their rights to the economic benefit from the transferred
property and, although belatedly, in fact enforced their rights to
such benefits by filing the claim for unpaid rent. Based on these
objective facts the court rejected the Service's argument of an
implied agreement between the donor and the beneficiary that
donor would retain economic benefits from the transferred
property. 104
IV. COURTS SHOULD REJECT THE SERVICE'S INTENT
BASED ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS
The Service promotes adoption of an intent based approach
to the determination of economic substance. 105 This approach
ignores the holdings of the United States Supreme Court
rejecting a subjective intent analysis in favor of objective
criteria. An intent based test unnecessarily increases the
potential for litigation by the Service. It also permits the
Service to subjectively assess tax based on the Service's
perception of the tax savings motive or intent of the taxpayer.
In contrast, an objective economic substance analysis based on
the three criteria enunciated in this article avoids the Service
assessing a taxpayer's subjective motive or intent. The objective
economic substance test denies estate tax savings in the context
of abusive planning strategies, and at the same time protects
those estate planning strategies conferring legally enforceable
economic benefits in an effort to achieve wealth transfer tax
savings.
104. The court highlighted the enforceable rights of the children:
By reason of the deed, they acquired the right to the economic benefits flowing
from the ownership and use of the land-the right to a fair rental for its
use.... However, decedent and petitioner were legally obligated, as tenants, to
pay a fair, customary rental for the rights which they enjoyed, and the children
were entitled, as landlords, to require the rent to be paid.
Id. at 670-671. The United States Supreme Court signaled the appropriateness of
recognizing enforceable legal rights provided in the contract. Comm'r v. Noel, 380 U.S.
678 (1965).
105. See, supra, discussion accompanying notes 4 - 8.
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A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
NEGATE AN INTENT BASED ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court holdings consistently
reject any analysis that relies on the transferor's motive or
intent for making the transfer.106 These holdings indicate a
clear precedent against adoption of the Service's version of
economic substance. The opinions of the United States Supreme
Court outline a common law of estate planning as embodied in
the three criterion of the objective economic substance test.
Those criteria ensure that a legally enforceable economic benefit
must transfer to achieve tax savings, and that the transferor
and beneficiary must implement and respect the transfer of
economic benefit. The opinions of the United States Supreme
Court ignore taxpayer's tax avoidance motive or intent, in favor
of taxpayer's objective manifestations.
In its decision in Commissioner v. Church's Estate,10 7 the
Court emphasized the objective economic substance of the
transaction. It noted that as early as 1884, the Pennsylvania
court appropriately imposed death taxes not based on intent, but
on actual possession and enjoyment of the property. The Court
stated: "It was further held in that case that the test of
'intended' was not a subjective one, that the question was not
what the parties intended to do, but what the transaction
actually effected as to title, possession and enjoyment.' ' 08
Again in United States v. Estate of Grace'0 9 the Court
declined consideration of the intent of the parties in determining
106. Supreme Court cases addressing transfers in contemplation of death
necessarily analyzed decedent's intent. Prior to its amendment in 1976, I.R.C. § 2035
(1976) required a determination of whether decedent made a transfer "in contemplation
of death." In order to determine whether the transfer was made in contemplation of
death the court had to determine whether "death [was] the impelling cause of the
transfer." City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945). See also,
Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U.S. 630 (1946); United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102,
118 (1931). This inquiry focused on taxpayer's intent and motive. Congress repealed this
subjective test in favor of a bright line three year rule, that included in decedent's gross
estate all gifts made within three years of death. I.R.C. § 2035 (1977). The rule was
amended again in 1981, to delete the three year rule with respect to all transfers except
the narrow class of transfers that would have been included under I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037,
2038 or 2042, but for the transfer at issue. Congress through its amendment of I.R.C. §
2035, likewise, indicated its preference to avoid questions of intent in the family estate
planning context.
107. 335 U.S. 632, 637 (1949).
108. Id. at 638.
109. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
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whether the reciprocal trusts created by husband and wife were
includible in their respective gross estates. The Court stated:
Emphasis on the subjective intent of the parties in creating the
trusts, particularly when those parties are members of the same
family unit, creates substantial obstacles to the proper application
of the federal estate tax laws. As this Court said in Estate of
Spiegel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
'Any requirement... (of) a post-death attempt to probe the
settlor's thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially
impair the effectiveness of... (section 811(c)) as an
instrument to frustrate estate tax evasions.'
We agree that 'the taxability of a trust corpus ... does not hinge
on a settlor's motives, but depends on the nature and operative
effect of the trust transfer.'
110
The Court in Grace looked only to the objective facts to
determine whether the trusts at issue were reciprocal.11'
In both Church's Estate and Grace, the taxpayer urged the
Court to consider the intent of the parties that a completed
transfer occurred, and in conjunction, the absence of a tax
avoidance motive of the taxpayer. The Court appropriately
focused only on objective economic substance, because to do
otherwise would lead to contradictory results. As demonstrated
in the early Supreme Court decisions, Klein v. United States112
and The St. Louis Trust Company113 cases, a focus on either
form or intent given the same objective facts can lead to
inconsistent results. Nevertheless, the Service and some lower
courts have failed to heed United States Supreme Court
precedent rejecting any focus on taxpayer's intent or motive to
achieve estate tax savings.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ALSO NEGATE AN INTENT
BASED ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS
Good policy dictates Federal estate and gift tax provisions
be consistently enforced. As demonstrated by these Supreme
Court cases, an analysis that turns on the subjective intent of
the taxpayer produces inconsistent tax results. Over the years
both the Judiciary and Congress have recognized this difficulty
110. Id. at 323. (The Court quoted from its earlier decision in Estate of Spiegel v.
Comm'r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949), and also cited its decision in Comm'r v. Estate of Church,
335 U.S. 632 (1949)).
111. See supra, discussion accompanying note 49.
112. 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
113. 296 U.S. 39 (1935) and 296 U.S. 48 (1935), both overruled by, Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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and have endorsed an objective standard in the application of
the Federal estate and gift tax. Objective factors relied upon by
the three criteria outlined in this article avoid the subjective
results of an intent based economic substance test.
It is not necessary to look further than the Service's use of
the treasury regulations to demonstrate the possibilities for
inconsistent enforcement of the Federal estate and gift tax based
on the Service's intent based economic substance approach.
Treasury has promulgated a gift tax regulation that provides:
Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential
element in the application of the gift tax to the transfer. The
application of the tax is based on the objective facts of the transfer
and the circumstances under which it is made, rather than on the
subjective motives of the donor.
114
The Service relies on objective facts indicating a transfer of
value to exact a gift tax when the taxpayer argues that a gift
was not intended. 115 When convenient to its position, however,
the Service turns a blind eye to the position taken in the
regulation and urges courts to look at the subjective intent of the
taxpayer to exact an estate tax in the event the taxpayer argues
that a transfer should be respected for gift tax purposes and the
Service argues it should not.
1 6
The Service's argument, as set forth in recent field service
advice, that a transaction lacks economic substance if the
taxpayer's primary purpose was tax savings, flies in the face of
Supreme Court precedent. 117 That precedent recognizes the
need for predictable application of the Federal estate and gift
tax provisions. In promoting its intent based economic
substance test, the Service pays no attention to the broad policy
implications of its analysis. Taken to its logical extreme, the
intent based economic substance analysis would ignore for lack
of economic substance any transfer undertaken by a taxpayer to
minimize wealth transfer tax, despite objective facts indicating a
transfer of economic benefit. In contrast, an analysis based on
the three criteria of the objective economic substance test
outlined in this article recognizes a taxpayer's right to engage in
a tax savings transfer, so long as the taxpayer in fact transfers a
legally enforceable economic benefit.
114. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (2003).
115. See, Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330 (1984), discussed supra at note 42.
116. See, e.g., Murphy v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, T.C.M. (RIA) 90472, 1990
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 (1990), discussed infra text accompanying note 135.
117. See I.R.S. FSA 2000-49-003 at 23.
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C. SOME LOWER COURTS FAIL TO APPLYAN OBJECTIVE
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS.
As authority for its intent based economic substance test,
the Service relies upon a number of lower court cases that focus
on a transferor's tax avoidance motive or intent to invalidate the
estate planning transfer. Many of those cases involved what
could be characterized as a abusive estate planning schemes. In
each case, the lower court could have arrived at the same
holding by applying an objective economic substance test based
on the three criteria outlined. Those courts could have avoided
the negative policy implications of an intent based tax avoidance
focus, and still arrived at the "right" holding.
The most troubling aspect of the Service's intent based
economic substance test is the ease with which strict application
of the test can negate both abusive and non-abusive planning
techniques. 18 The Service asserts this test in the context of
main stream estate planning techniques, such as the Crummey
withdrawal right and the family limited partnership.119 Focus
on the taxpayer's tax avoidance motive or intent imbues
planning techniques with unnecessary uncertainty. In contrast,
the objective economic substance test rejects the more subjective
analysis asserted by the Service, and provides more certainty to
the estate planning process.
The following discussion analyzes those cases most heavily
relied upon by the Service as authority for the intent based
economic substance analysis. 120 The discussion explains the
application of the intent based economic substance analysis to
the case facts. It then demonstrates the ability to arrive at the
same holding with the more predictable objective economic
substance test.
118. The Service has indicated its willingness to attack certain types of abusive
trust arrangements based on a substance over form analysis. I.R.S. Notice 97-24, 1997-
16 IRB 6; See also, I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-28-004 (Jul. 12, 1996) (Citing Heyen and
Deal, the Service indicated that the courts found "the taxpayers intended to do in
substance something other than what they purported to do in form.").
119. See, Cristofani v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74 (1991). The Service also has aggressively
asserted this approach in the context of family limited partnership, as evidenced by its
statements in I.R.S. FSA 2000-49-003 (Sept. 1, 2000).
120. The Service also cites for support Schultz v. United States, 493 F.2d 1225 (4th
Cir. 1974) discussed, supra, at note 72; and Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp.2d 700
(W.D. Tex. 1998) discussed, infra, at note 130.
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1. Heyen v. Commissioner
One of the most heavily cited cases by the Service, is the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Heyen v. United States.121 In Heyen,
decedent transferred stock in two different banks to 29
recipients, who were not members of decedent's family. The
recipients endorsed the stock certificates in blank, and in turn
the transfer agent reissued all the certificates in the names of
members of decedent's family. This planning technique would
avail decedent of 29 more annual gift tax exclusion amounts
than were otherwise available. Later, it was discovered by the
transfer agent that two of the recipients in fact had not endorsed
the certificates in blank, and the transfer agent had to correct
the mistake. The Heyen court found that "[t]he recipients either
did not know they were receiving a gift of stock and believed
they were merely participating in stock transfers or had agreed
before receiving the stock that they would endorse the stock
certificates in order that the stock could be reissued to
decedent's family."1
22
The Heyen court focused on decedent's donative intent and
subjective motives. 123 The court indicated that the treasury
regulations do not preclude consideration of intent and motive to
make a gift.124 The court reasoned that donative intent suggests
a gift. It found: "The evidence at trial indicated decedent
intended to transfer the stock to her family rather than to the
intermediate recipients." 25 It also found: "It was decedent's
wish in transferring the stock that gift taxes be avoided."126 The
court held the gifts to the 29 recipients were not eligible for the
annual gift tax exclusion because they were in fact indirect gifts
to decedent's family. 12
7
The Heyen court could have avoided the slippery slope of
addressing taxpayer intent. It could have relied upon the
objective economic substance test to reach the same result. The
objective facts of Heyen indicate a failure to meet the
121. 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991).
122. Id. at 361.
123. The Heyen court assessed a penalty for the fraudulent filing of a gift tax
return. In order to prove fraud, the Service must demonstrate an intent to evade tax.
Id. at 364. Focus on taxpayer's intent is entirely appropriate with respect to the issue of
fraud.
124. Id. at 362.
125. Id. at 363.
126. Id. at 361.
127. Id. at 364.
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implementation criterion. The implementation criterion
requires the transferor and beneficiaries to respect the legally
enforceable economic benefits subject to the transfer. An actual
disregard of the legal rights of the beneficiaries negates any
objective economic substance. The donor, along with the
transfer agent, ignored the rights of the two recipients that did
not endorse the stock certificates in blank. In addition,
testimony at trial indicated:
"[Taxpayer] contacted various initial stock recipients to determine
whether they would be willing to effectuate retransfer of stock to
family members. Other initial recipients, whom she had not
previously contacted, were asked at the time the stock was
transferred to them to sign their names to blank stock certificates
to facilitate a stock transfer to family members."
128
This testimony also indicates an implied agreement between the
taxpayer and the recipients to ignore any legal rights of the
recipients to the economic benefit of the stock certificates.
In a later, but similar case, Estate of Bies v.
Commissioner, 129 the Tax Court cited Heyen. In Bies, like Heyen,
the parent made annual exclusion gifts of family business stock
to her two sons and two daughter-in-laws, and the daughter-in-
laws pursuant to a prior agreement immediately transferred the
stock received to their husbands, who were the donor's sons.
The parent declined to make similar annual exclusion gifts to
her daughters because they were not involved in the family
business. The court noted that the daughters-in-law, like the
daughters, also were not involved in the family business.
Although the court cited Heyen, it did not adopt the "intent"
reasoning applied in Heyen. Rather the Tax Court appropriately
reasoned that the objective facts of the simultaneous transfers
demonstrated a pre-arranged plan, and collapsed the steps into
a single transaction. 130 The court traced the economic benefit,
which in this case was the cash, to determine the true donee.
128. Id. at 365. Based on this testimony, the appeals court affirmed liability for the
fraud penalty assessed by the Service. The court stated: "As a whole, the time and
manner of the transfers and plaintiffs actions, along with her sophistication regarding
the tax matters at issue, are consistent with a finding that she intended to evade taxes."
Id. The court defined fraud for purposes of assessing a penalty as an "intentional
wrongdoing, and the intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be
owing." Id. at 364.
129. 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, T.C.M. (RIA) 54105, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 398, 11
(2000).
130. Id. at 12. See also, Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp.2d 700 (W.D. Tex.
1998)(Court applied a similar analysis and ignored the transfer to an intermediary for
the purposes of obtaining a minority discount.).
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The court essentially applied both the economic benefit and the
implementation criteria to invalidate the transaction.
2. Deal v. Commissioner
The Service also relies on the holding of Deal v.
Commissioner. 131 The taxpayer in Deal transferred unimproved
land to a trust. Pursuant to the terms of the trust, taxpayer
retains a life income interest, and the daughters receive the
property remaining in the trust on taxpayer's death. At the
time of transfer, each of her four daughters executed four
separate unsecured non-interest bearing demand notes equal to
the annual gift tax exclusion. The sum of the notes equaled the
value of the land transferred to the trust. Taxpayer forgave four
of the notes on December 30, the day after the transfer to the
trust. Five days later on January 5, she forgave four more of the
notes. She forgave the remaining notes in early January of the
following years until the purchase price was fully forgiven.
132
Taxpayer asserted she sold the property to her daughters.
The court emphasized the intent of taxpayer:
After carefully considering the record, we think that the notes
executed by the daughters were not intended to be enforced and
were not intended as consideration for the transfer by the
[taxpayer], and that, in substance, the transfer of the property was
by gift. There is no evidence that [taxpayer] intended to sell the
property to her daughters. On the contrary, a donative intent is
evidenced.133
The court pointed to the fact that more than one-half the value
of the notes were canceled within six days of the transfer in
trust. It characterized the notes as a "mere device" to avoid gift
tax.134 The court disregarded taxpayer's argument that the
daughters were legally liable on the notes.135
Rather than focusing on intent, the tax court could have
131. 29 T.C. 730 (1958).
132. Id. at 734.
133. Id. at 736.
134. Id.
135. The Service indicated its approval of Deal in Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343.
Indicative of its position, it stated: "Thus, in the instant case, whether the transfer of
property was a sale or a gift depends upon whether, as part of a prearranged plan, G
intended to forgive the notes that were received when G transferred the property. It
should be noted that the intent to forgive notes is to be distinguished from donative
intent, which, as indicated by section 25.2511-1(g)(1) of the regulations, is not relevant.
A finding of an intent to forgive the note relates to whether valuable consideration was
received and, thus, to whether the transaction was in reality a bona fide sale or a
disguised gift." See also Rev. Rul. 81-286, 1981-2 C.B. 177 (1981).
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more appropriately focused on the economic benefit and
implementation criteria of the objective economic substance test.
The court could have based its decision on the economic benefit
criterion. The non-interest bearing and unsecured nature of the
demand notes demonstrate the transfer of economic benefit to
the daughters and conversely the lack of a clear legal right to
any economic benefit retained by the taxpayer. In addition, the
court could have found a failure of the implementation criterion
based on the objective facts that taxpayer and her daughters
had an implied agreement to ignore the terms of the notes. The
facts indicate more than half the value of the non-interest
bearing and unsecured notes was forgiven within six days of the
transfer. The writing of the notes and the almost immediate
forgiveness of more than half of the purchase price amounted to
a disregard of the legal rights the notes represented. The
analysis based on the objective economic substance test avoids
the need to make the difficult determination of subjective intent
among family members.
Addressing similar facts, other courts have focused on
whether the objective facts of the transaction indicate an
implied agreement to ignore the legal rights of the transferor as
evidenced by the notes. 136 A number of courts have approved
notes that were secured by a mortgage, and have relied on the
objective criterion that the secured interest evidences a bona-
fide creditor-debtor relationship. 137 Court decisions that focus
on objective criteria evidencing legally enforceable rights to
economic benefits are less likely to lead to inconsistent decisions
than those decisions that focus on the subjectiveness of
taxpayer's intent. This is because those courts enunciate certain
factors that can be relied upon to imbue the estate planning
transfer with economic substance.
3. Murphy v. Commissioner
The facts of Murphy v. Commissioner,138 a case often cited
by the Service, involved a family corporation. Eighteen days
136. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674, 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 5
(1996), affd 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 60,277, 79 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2843, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11426 (9th Cir., 1997); Kelley v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 321 (1974); Haygood v.
Comm'r, 42 T.C. 936 (1964); Wilson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1992-480.
137. Kelley v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 321 (1974); Haygood v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 936 (1964);
Wilson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-480.
138. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, T.C.M. (RIA) 90472, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520
(1990).
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before decedent in Murphy died of cancer, she transferred an
0.88 percent interest in their family corporation to each of her
children, and, thus, retained only a 49.6 percent minority
interest. The taxpayer argued that retention of a less than 50
percent interest resulted in substantial estate tax savings
because such an interest is much less valuable than an interest
in which the transferor controls the company. The court cited
extensively from letters decedent received from her tax adviser
detailing the dramatic estate tax savings that would result from
such a transfer, and minimizing the potential loss of control by
assuring decedent that she and her children would still retain
control of the company. 139
The court determined decedent's "sole and explicit purpose
[was] to obtain a minority discount."1 40 Citing two United States
Supreme Court cases that addressed valuation of interests for
purposes other than the federal estate tax, the tax court held: "A
minority discount should not be applied if the explicit purpose
and effect of fragmenting the control block of stock was solely to
reduce Federal tax."' 4 ' The tax court, thus, disallowed any
valuation adjustment for the minority character of the interest
retained by decedent.
The Murphy court prefaced its reasoning by stating: "We do
not apply family attribution in reaching this result, and we
believe our result is fully consistent with the 1981 amendments
to section 2035."142 The court, however, proceeded to do just that
- apply family attribution and ignore the 1981 amendments to
Section 2035 of the Code eliminating the statute's prior intent
based focus. To support its decision that the stock transfer in
Murphy lacked substance the court highlighted the continuation
of family control as a factor. It stated:
"During the 18-day period between the lifetime gifts of the stock to
decedent's two children and her death, decedent continued to be
chairman of the board and her two children held the two top
management positions. We believe that all concerned intended
nothing of substance to change between the time of transfer and
the time of her death, and that nothing of substance did
change."
143
It also noted that "there was [an] implicit understanding among
139. 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 at 15-16.
140. 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 at 52.
141. 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 at 54.
142. Id.
143. 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 at 58.
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all concerned to retain control of the business."1' The court
referenced a number of pre-1993 holdings that disallowed
minority discounts in the family context. It did not, other than
in its prefacing statement, make even indirect reference to the
Service's 1993 revenue ruling allowing minority discounts with
respect to transfers to family members. 145 Nor did it recognize,
as did the 1981 amendments to Section 2035 of the Code, that
transfers immediately before death are no longer to be treated
as if made in contemplation of death except in limited
circumstances.
The Murphy court took a step no other court has taken in
the determination of the Federal estate and gift tax when it held
that because decedent's "explicit purpose ... was solely to
reduce estate tax," the transfer would be ignored for estate tax
purposes. 46 The court likely took that step because it would be
difficult to ignore the transfer of the 0.88 percent interest given
the existing precedent against family attribution and the 1981
amendment of Section 2035 of the Code.
Applying the objective economic substance test to the facts
in Murphy admittedly would have presented the court with a
difficult decision. The gift of the 0.88 percent interest in shares
effectively transferred title to the children. The court
questioned, however, whether valuable economic benefits
actually transferred. At the time of the transfer, decedent was
diagnosed with cancer and died 18 days later, her position on
the board did not change after the transfer and neither did the
positions of her children. The transfer was not made until the
last possible moment given decedent's declining physical state.
Also, the trustee of the children's trusts, that had previously
received gifts of stock, assured decedent it would follow her
wishes as trustor 47  This assurance by the trustee is an
objective factor indicating that the control decedent and her
family exerted would not changed because of the transfer. 48
Control is the economic benefit typically given up to achieve
minority discounts. Rather than basing its holding solely on
decedent's tax avoidance motive, the court could have found the
implementation criterion lacking.
144. 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 at 60.
145. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
146. 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 at 54.
147. Id. at 57.
148. The court referred to the continued control of decedent and her family several
times in the opinion. Id. at 23, 58, 74, 75.
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D. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX ESCHEWS AN INTENT BASED ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS
Very few courts have adopted the intent based economic
substance argument asserted by the Service. Most courts rely
on an analysis that questions whether any of the three criteria
of the objective economic substance test is missing. Objective
criteria correlate most closely with the provisions of the Code.
In contrast, a focus on taxpayer intent to avoid tax disregards
the very nature of what the Code subjects to tax.
As recognized by the economic benefit criterion of the
objective economic substance test, the Code taxes transfers of
property with significant value. For estate and gift tax
purposes, property consists of a bundle of rights. To the extent a
valuable property right is transferred for less than adequate
consideration, the transferor has made a transfer subject to
federal estate and gift tax. The taxing statute does not take into
account whether the transferor subjectively intended to make a
transfer. It taxes the actual transfer of an economic benefit.
Transferors generally document the rights transferred by
written trust or other agreement. The document sets forth the
legal rights transferred.1 49 If the beneficiary may legally enforce
an agreement, such as a trust or contract, it follows that the
transferor has transferred the rights and economic benefits
provided in the trust or other agreement for purposes of
applying the gift tax (or, if the transfer is on death, the estate
tax). The documentation criterion recognizes the necessity of
enforceable legal rights to the economic benefit transferred.
Only to the extent the parties ignore the enforceable legal rights
documented in the agreement should the transfer be ignored for
transfer tax purposes. The implementation criteria ensures that
the transferor and beneficiary implement the transfer in accord
with the legally enforceable rights.
Focus on taxpayer's subjective tax savings intent, as
opposed to objective circumstances, adds an element not present
in the statutory language. To the extent the transferor gives
149. The Tenth Circuit in Davenport v. Comm'r, 184 F.3d 1176, 1187-88 (10th Cir.
1999) reviewed the objective factors in order to determine whether a donor in fact made
a gift of stock. The court noted the written deed of gift evidencing a transfer, the
relinquishment of the donor's right to vote the stock, and the issuance of dividends to the
donee as objective evidence that the donor intended a gift of stock. The Tenth Circuit
appropriately focused on these objective facts to determine if the form and economic
substance indicated a gift.
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away a property right without receiving consideration, a taxable
event occurs for wealth transfer tax purposes. The lack of
adequate consideration for the transfer indicates donative
purpose. As a consequence the courts should limit any inquiry
to whether the objective facts and circumstances indicate the
transfer of a legally enforceable economic benefit for less than
adequate consideration. The objective economic benefit test
achieves this goal.
VI. APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES TO
POPULARIZED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES
The law should be interpreted in a predictable manner.
Estate planning transactions especially depend on a consistent
and predictable application of the Code. Ignoring a transfer
based on a taxpayer's tax avoidance motive, as urged by the
Service, allows the Service to subjectively enforce the estate and
gift tax provisions of the Code.
The vast majority of courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, recognize this need for predictability. Those
courts, as indicated by the following discussion, determine the
validity of popular estate planning techniques based on the
criteria that comprise the objective economic benefit test
outlined in this article. For the sake of predictability, courts
should continue to employ these criteria, and to reject
application of the Service's intent based economic substance test
in the context of Federal estate and gift tax.
A. THE CRUMMEY DEMAND POWER
One of the most popular estate planning techniques is use of
the Crummey withdrawal power, named after the seminal case
approving its use. 150 The Crummey withdrawal power allows a
donor to obtain the benefit of the annual gift tax exclusion and,
at the same time, allows the donor to place property in trust and
thereby control its future use.
1. Estate Planning Opportunities
Specifically, the gift tax annual exclusion allows a donor to
transfer by gift up to $10,000 (as that amount is indexed for
inflation) to an individual donee each year without incurring
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any Federal wealth transfer tax consequences. 151 For example, a
client could give $10,000 in cash outright to each of ten
grandchildren this year, and, thus, dispose of $100,000 of her
estate without any wealth transfer tax consequences. The client
could do the same thing next year, and each year thereafter. By
aggressively making annual exclusion gifts, a moderately
wealthy client can avoid any imposition of Federal gift or estate
tax. The only wrinkle is the necessity that the transfer by gift
be one of a present and not a future interest.
15 2
The gift tax annual exclusion is denied for gifts of future
interests. The United States Supreme Court approved the
Treasury Regulation definition of future interest which includes
those interests "limited to commence in use, possession, or
enjoyment at some future date or time."153 Coinciding with this
definition, the Treasury Regulations define present interest as
"[an unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or
enjoyment of property or the income from property .... ,,154 The
United States Supreme Court has held that the donee must
obtain a substantial present economic benefit from the
transferred property in order for the donor to obtain the benefit
of the gift tax annual exclusion. 55 Thus, without the Crummey
withdrawal power it would be difficult to obtain an annual
exclusion for gifts of property in trust.
156
The Crummey withdrawal power allows a beneficiary a
specified period of time to withdraw property from a trust, and
thereby obtain its immediate possession. In general, the
151. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2002). The gift tax annual exclusion as indexed for inflation
increased to $11,000 as of 2002. Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623.
152. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (2002).
153. Comm'r v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 446 (1945); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a).
154. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b).
155. Fondren v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945). The United States Supreme Court
held that where as in Fondren the donee's right to the income or use of the property is
subject to the discretion of a trustee, the gift is one of a future interest. Id. at 21. In that
case, the trust directed that the trustee "shall provide for the support, maintenance and
education . . ., using only the income of said estate for the purpose if it be sufficient." Id.
at 22. In an earlier case, Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 408 (1941), the United
States Supreme Court held that where the donee had to join with another in order to
access property held in trust, the gift was also of a future interest. In that same case,
the Court disallowed an annual exclusion for the income interest because the corpus of
the trust was a life insurance policy that would not produce income until the death of the
donor. Id. at 409.
156. If the trust required the trustor to distribute to the beneficiary all income of
the trust, the donor could claim a gift tax annual exclusion for the present value of the
income interest. Treas Reg. § 25.2503-3(b). Most clients, however, prefer that income be
accumulated during the minority of a beneficiary.
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transferor places property in trust, and for a certain number of
days (usually thirty) the trust beneficiary may withdraw the
amount of the transfer up to the allowable Federal gift tax
annual exclusion. If the beneficiary does not withdraw the
transferred property within that time period, the withdrawal
right ceases and the transfer becomes subject to the terms of the
trust. The withdrawal right confers upon the beneficiary the
legal right to obtain the immediate use and possession of the gift
to the trust, and qualifies for the gift for the annual exclusion.
Few, if any, beneficiaries in fact exercise the withdrawal right;
thus, the property transferred becomes subject to the trust
terms.
2. Objective Economic Substance Analysis Employed
The courts implicitly have applied the objective economic
substance analysis as it has emerged in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court to uphold Crummey withdrawal
rights, despite the Service's substance-over-form attack. In
response to the Service, the courts initially emphasized the legal
enforceability of the beneficiary's right to withdraw property
from the trust on demand, the documentation criterion. The
courts and, in particular, the Ninth Circuit, have consistently
rejected the Service's focus on whether the trustor or the
beneficiaries ever in fact intended that the beneficiary would
withdraw property from the trust. Instead, the courts focus on
the legal right of the beneficiary to withdraw and, thus, in
substance obtain the economic benefit of the transfer.
The Ninth Circuit in Crummey v. Commissioner held that a
minor beneficiary's right to demand withdrawal of trust
property for a specific period of time qualified for the gift tax
annual exclusion. 157  In Crummey, taxpayers created an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of their four children, two of
them minors. The trust allowed each child to withdraw up to
the annual exclusion amount upon transfer to the trust. The
right of withdrawal terminated December 31 of each year. The
guardian of a minor child could exercise the power of withdrawal
on behalf of the child. The Service asserted the transfers to the
minors were future interests, but allowed the annual exclusion
with respect to the withdrawal rights of the adult beneficiaries.
The Ninth Circuit, addressing the withdrawal right of the
157. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
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minor beneficiaries, reasoned: "the important thing was the
right to enjoy rather than the actual enjoyment of the
property." 158 The Ninth Circuit disregarded the intentions of
trustors to create a long term trust, and concluded:
It becomes arbitrary for the I.R.S. to step in and decide who is
likely to make an effective demand. Under the circumstances
suggested in our case, it is doubtful that any demands will be
made against the trust-yet the Commissioner always allowed the
exclusion as to adult beneficiaries.
159
The court decided in favor of a bright line rule, and allowed the
gift tax annual exclusion because it was in fact possible for the
minors to petition for the appointment of a guardian to exercise
the withdrawal right on the minor's behalf. (Implicit in this
holding is the understanding that the guardian is subject to a
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the minor.) In other
words, it was possible for the minor beneficiaries to legally
enforce the withdrawal right, as required by the economic
benefit and documentation criteria.
The tax court in Cristofani v. Commissioner160 applied an
analysis similar to that in Crummey to approve the gift tax
annual exclusion for withdrawal rights held by contingent trust
beneficiaries, who would very likely never receive any trust
property. 1 1 In Cristofani, taxpayer gave Crummey withdrawal
rights not only to the primary income beneficiaries of the trust
(who would in all likelihood receive all the trust property on
termination of the trust), but also to the contingent
remaindermen. Taxpayer needed multiple Crummey powers in
order to fully shelter the transfer in trust from gift tax on the
basis of the annual exclusion.
The Service did not quibble with the ability of donor to
claim an annual exclusion for gifts to the trust subject to
withdrawal rights of the primary income beneficiaries. It took
the position, however, that the amount of the transfer subject to
the withdrawal rights of contingent remaindermen was not
sheltered by the annual exclusion. In response, the tax court
essentially assumed compliance with the economic benefit and
documentation criteria, and analyzed the validity of the
158. Id. at 85.
159. Id. at 88.
160. 97 T.C. 74 (1991).
161. Note that in Cristofani, it was unlikely the contingent remaindermen would
ever receive property from the trust. It was more likely that the trust proceeds would be
paid to the trustor's children instead.
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withdrawal rights in terms of the implementation criterion of
the objective economic benefit test. It found "[t]here was no
agreement or understanding between decedent, the trustees,
and the beneficiaries that decedent's grandchildren would not
exercise their withdrawal rights. ."... ,162 There were no facts,
other than the absence of exercise of the withdrawal rights, to
indicate an implied agreement.
Again, in Kohlsaat v. Commissioner,163 a memorandum
opinion, the tax court upheld the annual exclusion for Crummey
withdrawal rights. The facts of Kohlsaat were similar to
Cristofani, but with 16 contingent trust remainderpersons
holding withdrawal rights. 164 The Service argued that the
substance-over-form doctrine should apply in light of
"understandings [that] existed between decedent and the 16
contingent beneficiaries... to the effect that the beneficiaries
would not exercise their rights to demand distributions of trust
property."16 5 The Service contended that these understandings
negated decedent's donative intent. The tax court rejected this
argument and found no such understandings existed between
decedent, trustees and contingent beneficiaries. The court found
the beneficiaries offered several credible reasons for not
exercising the withdrawal rights. In the context of the objective
economic substance test, all three criteria, including the
implementation criterion, were met.
In yet a second memorandum opinion, the Tax Court in
Holland v. Commissioner,166 reiterated its rejection of the
Service's substance-over-form argument. In Holland, transferor
did not possess sufficient liquid assets to make annual exclusion
gifts to her three children, daughter-in-law and eight
grandchildren. In order to make such gifts, transferor borrowed
funds. Her son, acting as her agent, took twelve $10,000 checks
written to the donees, negotiated a bank note for $120,000,
executed a loan on behalf of donor and obtained the donees'
endorsements on the checks. Her son deposited the checks in an
agent account and purchased a $120,000 certificate of deposit,
which was in turn pledged as security for the loan. The Service
denied the gift tax annual exclusions on the basis that an
162. Id. at 77.
163. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2732, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 247 (1997).
164. The donor, thus, could have made a transfer of up to $160,000 free of any
Federal estate or gift tax consequences. 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 247 at 2.
165. Id. at 6-7.
166. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3236, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 356 (1997).
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agreement existed among the donor and donees regarding use of
the $10,000 transfers. The tax court again focused on whether
there was any agreement that would prevent the donee's legal
ability to use the $10,000. The tax court found no such
agreement. It noted that no evidence indicated transferor would
have refrained from making the transfer if a donee did not agree
to invest in the certificate of deposit, and noted that because the
family was investment oriented, they had agreed the best rate of
return would be achieved by pooling their gifts. These objective
facts indicated a legally enforceable withdrawal right, that was
implemented by the transferor and beneficiaries.
The tax court in each of these decisions acknowledged the
Crummey withdrawal rights were legally enforceable rights, and
as such should be recognized as a transfer of a present interest
even though it was unlikely the beneficiaries would ever in fact
benefit from the transfers to the trust. The court in all three
cases rejected the Service's argument that the donor and the
contingent beneficiaries had an implied understanding that the
beneficiaries would not exercise their rights, as demonstrated by
the fact that they in fact did not exercise their withdrawal
rights. The court in Kohlsaat indicated the beneficiaries had
several credible reasons for not exercising the withdrawal
rights, and stated: "The fact that none of the beneficiaries
exercised their rights or that none of the beneficiaries requested
notification of future transfers of property to the trust does not
imply to us that the beneficiaries had agreed with decedent not
to do so, and we refuse to infer any understanding."1 67
The tax court's decisions regarding the Crummey
withdrawal right appropriately applied the common law of
estate planning as developed in the United States Supreme
Court decisions. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court
in Commissioner v. Noel168 and in United States v. Byrum, 169 as
discussed above, emphasized the necessity of determining the
legally enforceable rights to economic benefits granted by the
applicable agreement or trust instrument. The legally
enforceable rights determine the tax consequences of a transfer.
So long as the beneficiary can legally enforce the withdrawal
right, the beneficiary has received the right to the immediate
possession of the transferred amount, and has met both the
167. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2732, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 247.
168. 380 U.S. 678 (1965); supra note 75.
169. 408 U.S. 125 (1972); supra note 79.
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economic benefit and documentation criteria. In order to obtain
the benefit of the gift tax annual exclusion, the statute requires
no more than the right to immediate possession. The courts also
appropriately rejected the Service's argument that an implied
agreement existed between the donor and beneficiaries against
exercise of the withdrawal rights. The lack of exercise does not
indicate a failure of the substance of the transaction to in fact
follow its form as required by the implementation criterion.
Only if the trustee had denied the exercise of the withdrawal
right or if in fact the beneficiaries had agreed to refrain from
exercising the right would the withdrawal right fail to satisfy
the implementation criterion.170
B. THE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Another popular estate planning technique is the use of the
family limited partnership to transfer property at substantial
wealth transfer tax savings. This planning technique requires a
donor to contribute property to a limited partnership, and
thereafter transfer limited partnership units to the donees.
1. Estate Planning Opportunities
The technique has several advantages to the donor: (1) the
donor as general partner may retain some continued control
over the transferred property, (2) the limited partnership may
provide added creditor protection, (3) the donor may receive the
benefit of the Federal gift tax annual exclusion and (4) the donor
may obtain a valuation discount with respect to the transferred
property. From a tax perspective the most significant advantage
of this planning technique is the resulting minority and lack of
marketability discounts, associated with the valuation of the
limited partnership interests transferred. The combined
discount in some cases can be as much as sixty-five percent,
allowing a donor to transfer assets at thirty-five percent of the
value of the assets owned by the family limited partnership.' 7'
170. Many estate planners specifically counsel their clients in writing regarding the
risk that in fact a beneficiary may exercise a withdrawal right. They also counsel their
clients to avoid any statements that would indicate an agreement, or even a mere
request, that the right not be exercised.
171. See Adams v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 60,418, 88
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6057, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13092 (N.D. Tex. 2001). (Court allowed a
20 percent minority interest discount, a 10 percent portfolio discount for poorly
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In order to obtain Federal wealth transfer tax benefits
offered by the family limited partnership, the donor contributes
assets, such as business interests and real property, to a limited
partnership, and the donor's children contribute cash. In
exchange for the contribution, the donor and donor's children
receive partnership interests; generally the donor receives
general partnership and limited partnership interests, and the
children receive limited partnership interests proportionate to
their respective contributions. 172 Some donors also transfer
partnership interests to a charity in an effort to obtain better
estate tax results. The donor annually gifts limited partnership
units up to the value of the Federal gift tax annual exclusion,
and at the same time the donor, as a general partner, continues
to manage the property of the limited partnership subject to
applicable fiduciary duties.
Prior to October 9, 1990, the family limited partnership
could be aggressively used to obtain Federal wealth transfer tax
savings. The taxpayer could obtain deep minority and lack of
marketability discounts. 173 The taxpayer also could obtain an
172. Where the donor intends for children to join in the management of the
transferred assets, the children also may receive general partnership interests in return
for their contribution. At times, the donor will prefer to relinquish management rights
completely, and receive in return only limited partnership interests.
173. The tax court memorandum opinion in Harrison v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH)
1306, T.C.M. (RIA) 87008, 1987 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 8 (1987), demonstrates the
effectiveness of the limited partnership as an estate planning technique prior to 1990. In
Harrison , decedent's son pursuant to a power of attorney transferred decedent's assets
consisting of real estate, oil and gas interests and marketable securities to a Texas
limited partnership. Decedent received a 1% general partnership interest and a 77.8%
limited partnership interest. Decedent's sons contributed assets, as well, and received
10.6% general partnership interests. The partnership was created August 1, 1979 at a
time when decedent was in poor health. Decedent died January 14, 1980. In an
adversarial proceeding, the state court found that "the partnership constituted 'a means
for the proper and necessary management of the properties of [decedent]' and that the
partnership agreement was 'advantageous to and in the best interests of [decedent]'."
1987 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 8 at 5 n2. The estate reaped transfer tax savings based on (i)
the lower value of the limited partnership interest and (ii) the lapse of decedent's
liquidation right at death. During life a general partner could unilaterally liquidate the
partnership and receive the fair value of his partnership interest, in this case
$59,555,020. At decedent's death this liquidation right lapsed when decedent's general
partnership interest automatically converted to a limited partnership interest valued,
based on its minority position, at $33,000,000. (If Harrison had been decided under
current law, Code section 2704 would have required that the lapsing right be ignored
and that the more than $25 million difference be added to the gross estate.)
The Commissioner unsuccessfully asserted that the court should ignore "the
effect the partnership agreement has upon decedent's limited partnership interest
because the partnership agreement was an attempt to artificially depress the value of
decedent's property for estate tax purposes." 1987 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 8 at 12. The
court indicated the agreement should be ignored "only if there is no business purpose for
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annual exclusion for gifts of limited partnership interests. 174 In
addition, the Service acknowledged the transferor's gross estate
would not include the value of any previously transferred
limited partnership interests on the basis of Sections 2036 or
2038 of the Code because the general partner transferor owed a
fiduciary duty to the limited partners.
175
Effective for transfers occurring after October 8, 1990,
Congress enacted special valuation rules that curtailed use of
many of the estate freeze techniques where the donor and
donor's family control the entity. 76 Now, in order to effectively
use a family limited partnership, the terms of the partnership
must comply with these special valuation rules. Even after
enactment of the special valuation rules, taxpayers can achieve
wealth transfer tax savings in the form of valuation discounts.
As with all Federal estate and gift tax statutes, the special
valuation rules divide up rights associated with assets. The
Code by its terms dictates the form that the limited partnership
agreement must take in order to achieve a valuation discount for
transfers of limited partnership interests. For example, if the
family limited partnership agreement contains restrictions on
liquidation rights not otherwise provided by applicable state
law, the restriction is disregarded for gift tax valuation
purposes. 177 Also, for example, if the partners enter into a
restriction on sale, the restriction is disregarded unless it meets
certain requirements of the Code. 78 If the family limited
the creation of the partnership or if the agreement is merely a substitute for
testamentary disposition." Id. at 12-13. The court found a business purpose. The
partnership provided a vehicle for the necessary and proper management of decedent's
properties. The court declined to find the agreement was a substitute for testamentary
disposition because (i) the agreement applied to all partners, (ii) decedent received
adequate consideration and (iii) there was no proof that the partnership was created
other than for business purposes. Id. at 13-14. See also Estate of Watts v. Comm'r, 823
F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1987).
174. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9415007 (Jan. 12, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9131006 (April 30,
1991).
175. The Service issued a series of private letter rulings acknowledging that the
fiduciary duties of the general partner would preclude inclusion of the transferred
interests in the general partner transferor's gross estate. The Service based its
reasoning on the United States Supreme Court holding in Byrum v. Commissioner, 408
U.S. 125, 137-43 (1972), supra at text accompanying note 79. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 9415007
(Jan. 12, 1994); 9332006 (Aug. 20, 1992); 9310039 (Dec. 16, 1992); 9131006 (April 30,
1991).
176. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704. In the context of the family limited partnership, the
agreement and transfers must not violate the parameters of Code Section 2701, 2703 and
2704.
177. I.R.C. § 2704(b) (2002).
178. I.R.C. § 2703 (2002).
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partnership agreement follows the correct form as prescribed by
these Code provisions in fulfillment of the economic benefit and
documentation criteria, and if the partners respect the legal
rights of the partners as set forth in the agreement in fulfillment
of the implementation criteria, courts should uphold the
planning technique and its tax benefits based on the objective
economic substance test.
The Service aggressively attacks the use of family limited
partnerships based on these special valuation rules and on a
substance over form argument. It has achieved varied success
in this effort. As evidenced by the following discussion, the
Service fails in its attack when the family limited partnership is
structured so as to meet the three criteria of the objective
economic substance test. The discussion also demonstrates the
Service has succeeded in thwarting this planning technique only
when either the documentation criterion fails because the
transfers were inappropriately structured, or when the
implementation criterion fails because the taxpayer has not
respected the transaction and ignored legally enforceable
partnership rights.
2. Successful Use of the Family Limited Partnership
The Service employs a multi-prong attack. It attacks the
family limited partnership based on a failure to comply with
each of the special valuation rules. It also attacks based on its
subjective intent based test.
The Service began its most recent campaign against the
aggressive use of family limited partnerships by issuing a series
of technical advice memoranda. 179 The Service carefully chose to
attack only those family limited partnerships susceptible to
characterization as testamentary substitutes. In each of the
technical advice memoranda, the partnerships were formed
within months of death or after the donor had been diagnosed
with a terminal illness. 180 The Service ruled that the formation
of the family limited partnership lacked any business purpose,
and that in substance it was nothing more than a testamentary
transfer. 18' The Service analogized to the tax court's prior
179. Tech. Adv. Mems. 98-42-003 (July 2, 1998); 97-35-003 (May 8, 1997), 97-30-004
(Apr. 3, 1997); 97-25-002 (Mar. 3, 1997), 97-23-009 (Feb. 24, 1997), 97-19-006 (Jan. 14,
1997).
180. Id.
181. This is the same argument reiterated in recent I.R.S. Field Service Advice. See
Vol. 64436
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decision in Murphy v. Commissioner8 2 where the court
disregarded the transfer of a minority interest in a corporation
18 days prior to decedent's death on the basis that taxpayer's
sole purpose was tax avoidance and without any business
purpose was merely a testamentary device. With the exception
of Murphy, the Service has had little success with this argument
in court. Courts generally recognize the legally enforceable
rights granted by the partnership agreement, and acknowledge
the likelihood of those rights impacting value of the partnership
interests 8
3
Courts also have rejected the Service's attack based on the
special valuation rule that ignores for valuation purposes
certain restrictions on the right to sell or use property. 8 4 The
Service urges characterization of the family limited partnership
agreement as such a restriction, and argues the family limited
partnership should be ignored with the full value of the property
contributed to the partnership taxed. The courts hold that
recognition of the family limited partnership is appropriate
where the limited partnership was properly formed under state
law. 8 5 They find that the property to which the special
valuation section applies is the partnership interest and not the
property originally transferred to the partnership. This analysis
essentially follows the lead of the United States Supreme Court,
as embodied in the documentation criterion of the objective
economic substance test, and recognizes the legally enforceable
economic rights of the partners with respect to their partnership
interests. The limited partnership agreement is the vehicle used
to document the legally enforceable rights of the partners, just
I.R.S. FSA 2000-49-003 (Sept. 1, 2000).
182. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, T.C.M. (RIA) 90472, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520
(1990).
183. Church v. United States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Tex. 2000), aff'd by
unpublished opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001). See also Estate of Strangi v.
Comm'r (Strangi II), 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing economic substance
of the partnership because it was unlikely a prospective purchaser would ignore the
partnership). Compare, Estate of Murphy v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, T.C.M.
(RIA) 90472, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520 (1990).
184. I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2). The Code section excepts from its application those
restrictions which are a bona fide business arrangement, not a device to transfer
property for less than full consideration and comparable to similar arm's length
transactions.
185. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi I), 115 T.C. 478 (2000), afId in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, (Strangi II) 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002)(court adopted in
full the tax court opinion regarding I.R.C. §2703); Church v. United States, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Tex. 2000), affd by unpublished opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir.
2001); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506 (2000).
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as a trust agreement documents and creates legally enforceable
rights of trust beneficiaries. The courts appropriately conclude
the limited partnership agreement creates enforceable legal
rights in the partners.
The courts have also rejected the Service's argument that
choosing to use a term partnership, as opposed to an "at will"
partnership, is an applicable restriction that should be ignored
pursuant to the special valuation rules. 8 6  The limited
partnership is formed for a term of years, for example 40, and
because of the stated term the limited partners may not
withdraw from the partnership until the end of the term. Such
a restriction depresses the value of the limited partnership
interest, and for this reason the Service argues that the
partnership term amounts to an applicable restriction. The
Code defines applicable restriction as one that effectively limits
the ability to liquidate the entity and that lapses or can be
removed alone or collectively by the donor or a member of the
donor's family. 8 7 The tax court 88 and the Fifth Circuit 8 9 have
held a term partnership that prevents withdrawal of the limited
partner until the end of the term is not an applicable restriction.
The tax court focused on the definition of applicable restriction
as one that effectively limits the ability of the entity to liquidate,
and distinguished liquidation from the inability of a limited
partner to withdraw from the partnership.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the tax court's holding, but did so
based on a different analysis. In the case reviewed by the Fifth
Circuit, the restriction could not lapse nor could liquidation
occur without first obtaining the agreement of a charity that
was also a partner. The courts focused on the plain language of
the statute and rejected the Service's argument because the
donor or family members could not alone or collectively remove
the restriction or liquidate as required by the statute because
they had to first obtain the agreement of the charity. The
courts, thus, focused on the legal rights of the partners as
granted under the partnership agreement, and found that the
186. See I.R.C. § 2704(b).
187. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(2)(A), (B) (Note that the statute provides an exception for any
restriction imposed by Federal or state law and for any commercially reasonable
restriction which arises as part of a financing arrangement with an unrelated party.)
188. Kerr v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), affd, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002); Jones
v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121 (2001); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506 (2000), Harper v.
Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2232, T.C.M. (RIA) 53939, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 242
(2000).
189. Kerr v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 490 (2002).
Vol. 64
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economic benefits conferred complied with the statutory
requirements. The planning strategy analyzed under Section
2704 of the special valuation rules meets the economic benefit
and documentation criteria.
Additionally, the courts have rejected the Service's
argument that, upon formation of the family limited
partnership, the donor makes a gift of the difference between
the value of the assets contributed to the family limited
partnership and the value of the partnership interest received in
return. 190 The tax court originally reasoned that even absent a
business purpose a gift did not occur because the donor received
in return interests in the partnership allowing the donor to
maintain control of the partnership. 19' In a later decision, the
tax court explained its earlier reasoning as follows: "The Court
held that, because the taxpayer received a continuing interest
in the family limited partnership and his contribution was
allocated to his own capital account, the taxpayer had not made
a gift at the time of contribution." 92 Accordingly, no economic
benefit had been transferred sufficient to result in a gift tax.
So long as the donor and donees retain under the
partnership agreement only those rights, and economic benefits,
allowable by the Code the courts have upheld the planning
technique and allowed a valuation discount on the transfer of
limited partnership interests. It is when the transaction has not
conferred legally enforceable economic benefits, or the
beneficiaries have failed to economically respect the form that
the Service has succeeded in limiting the tax savings of the
transaction. The court decisions demonstrate the necessity of
granting legally enforceable rights to the donees that fall within
the parameters of the Code, and the necessity of meeting the
three criteria of the objective economic substance test.
190. For example, in Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 121 (2001), the donor
contributed property valued at $ 17,615,857 and received in return limited partnership
interests valued at only $ 6,675,156. The Service contended the almost $9 million
difference in value amounted to a gift.
191. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi I), 155 T.C. 478, 490 (2000), affd in part
rev'd in part, (Strangi II), 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002)(adopted in full the reasoning
of the tax court rejecting the Service's argument that a gift occurs on formation of the
limited partnership).
192. Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121, 127-28 (2001).
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3. The Service's Successful Attacks
The court's decision in Shepherd v. Commissioner 9
3
demonstrates the importance of properly structuring and
documenting the transaction. The Service won in Shepherd,
where before it had failed in its argument that a gift occurs on
the formation of the limited partnership. In Shepherd, decedent
transferred lease land and bank stock to the family partnership,
and by the terms of the partnership agreement the capital
accounts of the donee partners increased proportionately based
on the partners' prior interests in the partnership. In addition,
the donor initially reported the gift as one of land, then amended
the gift tax return to report the gift as one of limited partnership
interests for which a valuation discount was claimed. The court
held that the gift of land to the partnership was an indirect gift
to the partners in light of the concurrent increase in the donee
partners' capital accounts. The court focused on the legal rights
transferred, and indicated it was compelled to determine the tax
consequences based on those rights. The majority opinion
declined to re-characterize the transaction based on the donor's
intent that partnership interests be transferred, as would the
dissenting opinion. In dicta, the majority indicated it would
have held differently if the donor had instead formed the
partnership, transferred the land, and only then transferred
partnership interests to the donees. Unfortunately, legal rights
to "partnership" interests had not been transferred. The plan
failed to satisfy the documentation criterion.
Court decisions have also emphasized the importance of
enforceable legal rights in the determination of whether the
transfer is one of an assignee interest in a limited partnership or
a limited partnership interest. Ostensibly, an assignee interest
is worth less than a limited partnership interest. An assignee
typically has no legal right to participate in management
decisions, and only has the right to the distributions that the
limited partner would otherwise be entitled. The courts have
valued the transferred interests as an assignee interest in the
partnership where the partners adhere to the legal rights
conferred on an assignee as opposed to a partner. 194 However,
193. Shepherd v. Comm'r, 155 T.C. 376, 385-86 (2000), affd 283 F.3d 1258, 1261
(11th Cir. 2002).
194. See, e.g., Estate of Adams v. United States, 218 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2000); Estate
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where the transfers were designated as transfers of limited
partnership interests, and the partners had not enforced the
formal legal steps required for admission of partners, the court
held the value should be based on a transfer of limited
partnership interests. 195 Again, the plan failed to satisfy the
documentation and implementation criteria.
The Service has also successfully challenged the family
limited partnership on the basis of an implied agreement
between the donor and the donee that the donor's actual use of
the property would not change. Courts have held that, in order
to achieve wealth transfer tax savings intended by a transfer,
the donor and donee must not ignore the documented legal
rights by implied agreement as demonstrated by the facts of the
case. 196  For example, in Estate of Schauerhamer v.
Commissioner197 the donor transferred limited partnership
interests to her children, but nevertheless continued to deposit
the partnership profits in her personal bank account and use
partnership profits in excess of her proportionate partnership
interest. The tax court held the transferred limited
partnerships includible in her gross estate because the facts
indicated an implied agreement to retain the benefit of the
transferred interests. 198 This case indicates the importance of
respecting the legal rights conferred by the partnership
agreement so as to give economic substance to the form of the
transaction, the implementation criterion.
The tax court in a recent memorandum opinion, Estate of
Strangi v. Commissioner,199 also found an implied agreement to
retain the benefit of the transferred interest. In Strangi,
decedent's attorney in fact formed a family limited partnership
two months prior to decedent's death. The attorney in fact
transferred to the partnership about 98 percent of decedent's
assets, including the residence, other real estate, cash,
securities, insurance policies, an annuity, receivables, and
partnership interests. In return, decedent's estate received a 99
195. Kerr v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), affd, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002).
196. See, supra text accompanying note 93.
197. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 276 (1997).
198. The court included the transferred interests in her gross estate based on I.R.C.
§ 2036. See also Estate of Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144 (2000); Thompson v.
Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, T.C.M. (RIA) 54890, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 254
(2002); Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, T.C.M. (RIA) 54745, 2002
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 127 (2002).
199. (Strangi III) T.C. Memo. 2003-145, 2003 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 144 (2003). See
discussion ofStrangi I and Strangi II at text accompanying footnotes 185, and 191.
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percent limited partnership interest, and a 47 percent interest
in the corporate general partner. Decedent's children
contributed property in return for a 53 percent interest in the
corporate general partner. Subsequently decedent's children
contributed a 1 percent shareholder interest in the general
partner to a charity. The four children of decedent and decedent
comprised the board of directors of the corporate general
partner, and by a signed unanimous consent named decedent's
attorney in fact as the corporate president pursuant to a broad
management agreement. Numerous distributions were made
from the partnership correlating in value to expenses incurred
by decedent, with corresponding distributions to the general
partner. In addition decedent continued to reside in the
residence contributed to the partnership, but did not in fact pay
rent. Instead rent simply accrued on the books of the
partnership and was not paid to the partnership until well after
decedent's death. The court included the assets of the limited
partnership in decedent's gross estate based on numerous
grounds. 200  First, the court found an implied agreement to
200. Each ground was based on inclusion under either I.R.C. §2036(a)(1) or
(a)(2)(2003). I.R.C. Section 2036(a) states:
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which
he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death - the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom."
The opinion assumes the decedent made a "transfer" that would trigger application of
I.R.C. Section 2036. In Strangi decedent contributed assets to the partnership and
received in return limited partnership interests representing the value of the assets
contributed. Decedent had not gratuitously transferred any of decedent's limited
partnership interests nor any interest in the corporate general partner to a third party.
Decedent could not "transfer" interests to himself. In an earlier tax court memorandum
opinion, the court declined to apply I.R.C. Section 2036 based on contributions of
partnership interests to a business trust taxed as a corporation. Estate of Michelson v.
Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1543, T.C.M. (RIA) 78371, 1978 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 143
(1978). The contribution of property to an entity in exchange for an interest in the
entity, without more, should not trigger application of I.R.C. Section 2036. Taken to its
logical conclusion, an analysis that applies I.R.C. Section 2036 based on formation of a
business entity would require inclusion in the gross estate of the value of the underlying
assets of every business entity formed by a decedent. To do otherwise would require the
court to analyze decedent's intent in forming the partnership, and send the court down
the slippery slope of determining a decedent's tax avoidance motive, a tangent that the
Supreme Court has warned against.
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retain the income from the assets based on the distributions
made to cover decedent's extraordinary expenses and the
continued occupancy of the residence without payment of cash
rent.20 1  These objective facts indicated a failure of the
implementation criterion. Second, the court indicated that by
entering into the management agreement with decedent's
attorney in fact, decedent retained the legally enforceable right
to income from the assets contributed to the partnership, a right
that would cause inclusion of retained assets in the gross
estate.20 2 Third, the court found a legally enforceable right of
decedent, through his attorney in fact, in conjunction with the
other interest holders to designate the persons who will possess
the income from the assets transferred to the partnership. 203
201. By not paying cash rent, decedent was essentially treating the residence as if
he owned it and had not transferred it to the partnership. Likewise, by receiving
distributions from the partnership each time decedent incurred an extraordinary
personal expense, decedent essentially treated the property as if it were his own and not
owned by the partnership.
202. In arriving at its conclusion, the court outlines the structure of the family
limited partnership. It concludes: "When distilled to their most essential terms, the
governing documents gave [decedent's attorney in fact] authority to specify distributions
from SFLP, which is entirely consistent with his authority under the 1988 power of
attorney." Based on these documents the court observed: "[Olur analysis ... of the
express documents suggests inclusion of the contributed property under section
2036(a)(1) based on the "right to the income" criterion, without need further to probe for
an implied agreement regarding other benefits such as possession or enjoyment."
The court's reasoning based on the documentation criterion assumes without analysis
that a "right" to income was retained by naming the decedent's attorney in fact, who
stands in decedent's shoes, as president of the corporate general partner. The United
States Supreme Court in Byrum specifically rejected such an argument. See discussion
at text accompanying note 81. The Supreme Court stated:
"The term 'right,' certainly when used in a tax statute, must be given its
normal and customary meaning. It connotes an ascertainable and legally
enforceable power.... Here, the right ascribed to Byrum was the power to use
his majority position and influence over the corporate directors to 'regulate the
flow of dividends' to the trust. That right was neither ascertainable nor legally
enforceable and hence was not a right in any normal sense of that term."
408 U.S. 125, 136-137 (1972) (This portion of the Court's analysis was not overruled by
the anti-Byrum amendment, as discussed at note 86.) Like in Byrum, the fact that
decedent's attorney in fact held management authority over the trust did not necessarily
confer on decedent a "legally enforceable right" to the income of the limited partnership,
especially in light of duties owed by the president to the corporate general partner and to
the limited partnership.
203. The tax court, thus, alternatively would include the assets of the family limited
partnership in decedent's gross estate based on application of I.R.C. Section 2036(a)(2).
The court found that decedent's attorney in fact, who stands in the shoes of decedent,
possessed, in conjunction with others, the legally enforceable right to determine the
timing of income distributions from the family limited partnership, a right found to
cause inclusion of trust assets in United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966). To
arrive at its conclusion, the tax court needed to distinguish the Supreme Court's holding
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Essentially, under the court's second and third grounds for gross
estate inclusion, the formation of the partnership failed the
documentation criterion because pursuant to the tax court's
interpretation of Section 2036 of the Code, the documents did
not allocate rights to economic benefits in a manner as required
by the statute to exclude the assets from the gross estate.
The Service's success in Hackl v. Commissioner2 4 also
demonstrates the importance of actually granting the legal
rights under the partnership agreement necessary to obtain the
hoped for tax benefit. The tax court in Hackl denied the gift tax
annual exclusion for gifts of membership interests in a family
limited liability company. It found that the donees of the
limited partnerships did not receive a present interest as
required by the Code; in other words, the donees did not have
the right to immediate possession of the economic benefit. In its
analysis, the Tax Court focused on the inability of the donee to
convert the interest in the limited liability company to cash
without first obtaining the approval of the donor of the gift, in
the donor's capacity as manager. The donee could not withdraw
the donee's capital account and obtain the value of the entity
interest. Also, the donee could not sell the donee's interest in
in Byrum, especially because the Service had previously issued private letter rulings
that rejected application of Section 2036 based on the Byrum decision. See Priv. Ltr.
Ruls. 94-15-007 (Apr. 15, 1994) and 93-10-039 (Mar. 12, 1993); Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-
006 (Aug. 2, 1991). Byrum essentially held, in part, that Section 2036 would not apply in
the context of a business corporation because the decedent as a majority shareholder
owed fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders that prevented him from holding a
legally enforceable right to do designate distribution of the income.
The court distinguishes Byrum on the basis of legal and economic constraints on the
powers of the donor in Byrum not present in Strangi. Those legal and economic
constraints include: (1) payment of corporate dividends to an independent trustee, who
in turn had discretion to pay income, (2) the exigencies of an operating business that
precluded complete control over distribution of income, and (3) the existence of unrelated
minority shareholders with significant holdings. The tax court indicated: "First, the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Byrum.... provides no basis for
"presuming" that fiduciary obligations will be enforced in circumstances divorced from
the safeguards of business operations and meaningful independent interests or
oversight. Second, the facts of this case belie the existence of any genuine fiduciary
impediments to decedent's rights." The tax court also states: "Intrafamily fiduciary
duties within an investment vehicle simply are not equivalent in nature to the
obligations created by the United States v. Byrum... scenario." This analysis is
extremely troubling and could have far reaching impact. A fundamental principle in
estate planning is that the existence of an enforceable legal right or duty is sufficient
without proof of its exercise. This principle underlies many estate planning techniques
including transfers subject to Crummey powers and transfers subject to ascertainable
standards. The tax court's analysis proves to much. Regardless of the familial
relationship of the parties involved, the legally enforceable fiduciary duties remain.
204. 118 T.C. 279 (2002).
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the limited liability company without approval, but could only
transfer an assignee interest in the limited liability company. In
dicta, the court indicated that the annual exclusion would have
been allowed if the donee could have done either of those:
withdraw the donee's capital account or sell the donee's interest
subject to a right of first refusal. The plan in Hackl failed to
meet both the economic benefit and documentation criteria for
obtaining an annual gift tax exclusion.
These decisions, in which the Service successfully attacked
the family limited partnership comply with the analysis of the
objective economic benefit test. The donor must transfer
economic benefits, that are legally enforceable under the limited
partnership agreement. Those economic benefits must not
violate the special valuation rules. Finally, the donor and
donees must respect the legally enforceable economic benefits
conferred. The form and the objective economic substance of the
transaction must coincide. One without the other is insufficient
to achieve wealth transfer tax benefits.
VII. ADVICE TO THE ESTATE PLANNER
Despite the inappropriateness of the Service's intent based
economic substance approach, the Service's argument has
impacted even those court decisions that in the final analysis
reject an intent based economic substance approach.20 5 The
Service's argument impacts court opinions because the court
must address each argument made by a party in its brief. For
this reason, an estate planner must consider the Service's
position when structuring an estate plan.
Specifically recent court decisions have discussed the health
of the decedent just prior to the transfer. The Service has urged
courts to look upon death bed transfers with disfavor, as did the
tax court in Murphy,206 the case most heavily relied upon by the
205. The Service's argument is reflected most recently in the Tax Court
memorandum opinion issued by Judge Nim in Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1641, T.C.M. (RIA) 54745, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 127 (2002). The objective
manifestations of the partners indicated a failure of the implementation criterion.
Nevertheless the court went on to state: "Hence, not only the objective evidence
concerning HFLP's history but also the subjective motivation underlying the entity's
creation support an inference that the arrangement was primarily testamentary in
nature. ... [T]he subjective impetus prompting decedent to form HFLP centered on what
would happen to his property after death." The tax court ignored Supreme Court
precedent urging a rejection of subjective motivation as a basis for determining estate
tax consequences.
206. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, T.C.M. (RIA) 90472, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 520
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Service when it argues economic substance. Deathbed transfers
smack of testamentary intent. In response, the tax court has
taken into account the fact that a taxpayer had undergone heart
bypass surgery and suffered seven heart attacks.2 7 In contrast,
the United States District Court in Texas has distinguished the
instance where the taxpayer's cancer was in remission and she
had recently purchased new clothing.208 The emphasis by some
courts on the health of the taxpayer at the time of the estate
planning transfer indicates the need for estate planning lawyers
to inquire as to the health of their client and, to the extent
possible, document the state of the client's good health.
In response to the Service's intent based economic substance
argument, recent court decisions also address the underlying
purpose of the transfer, and analyze whether the transfer
accomplishes a legitimate purpose. When the transfer involves
interests in a family business, the Service has emphasized the
need for a valid business purpose. The courts have accepted as a
valid business purpose the need to keep the family business in
the family.20 9 Recognition of the need to keep the family
business under family control comports with the donative
purpose that underlies all estate planning transfers - to pass
family wealth to family members. In anticipation of the
Service's argument, estate planners should document the
business purpose underlying the estate planning transfer, and
should ensure that the objective economic substance of the
transfer accomplishes the stated business purpose.
Also, following the tax court's most recent memorandum
decision, a cautious planner also would avoid using a business
entity to hold passive investment interests. 210 The tax court has
indicated in dicta that it will apply the estate tax Code
differently if the contribution to the family limited partnership
or other entity is of active business interests as opposed to
(1990).
207. Estate of Schuler v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 934, T.C.M. (RIA) 54171, 2000
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 465 (2000), affd 282 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2002).
208. Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 60,369, 85 A.F.T.R.2d
(RIA) 804, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Tex. 2000), affd without published opinion,
268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001).
209. Id. (noted as a valid business purpose the need to keep the working ranch in
name of taxpayer's and her descendants); Estate of Schuler v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH)
934, T.C.M. (RIA) 54171, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 465 (2000), affd, 282 F.3d 575 (8th
Cir. 2002) (in this case the actual transfers did not support the business purpose of
keeping the stock in the names of those children active in the family business).
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passive investment assets The tax court's basis for differing
treatment lies in what it sees as solely a tax avoidance purpose
when using passive investment assets.
Finally, the estate planner also should ensure that the
estate plan complies with the objective economic substance test,
based on Supreme Court precedent as set forth in this article.
The donor must transfer a legally enforceable economic benefit.
To the extent the legal rights result in the correct form as
required by the statute and to the extent the parties to the
transfer respect those legal rights, the estate planning technique
should achieve the desired wealth transfer tax savings.
Enforceable legal rights give economic substance to the form of
the transaction. The historical emphasis on objective economic
substance reflects the structure of the Federal estate and gift
tax. The Code taxes transfers based on rights retained and
rights transferred. It is appropriate for a court to trace the flow
of property in order to determine the rights in fact retained and
transferred, and to tax the transaction accordingly. The estate
planner should emphasize to clients the need for respecting in
economic substance the transfer of economic benefit and the
accompanying legally enforceable rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Federal estate and gift tax applies to the transfer of
valuable property rights. The Code determines when the
transfer of rights are taxable. It, thus, directs the form and the
substance that a transaction must take in order to minimize tax.
Substance is determined by tracing the legal rights associated
with economic benefits transferred. This can be done most
easily by following the actual money trail; and, absent a money
trail, by determining who in fact holds the legally enforceable
rights to the property. The objective economic substance test, as
set out in the three criteria, ensures that a transfer of value
actually occurs, and allocates tax burdens accordingly.
Donative purpose underlies transfers subject to the estate
and gift tax. The primary objective of most donors is to give the
greatest amount of assets possible to their children and
grandchildren. This necessarily means that the transaction
must be structured to minimize wealth transfer tax. Because
tax minimization necessarily underlies each estate planning
transfer, criteria other than intent to avoid or minimize tax are
necessary to define economic substance in the estate planning
context. The objective economic substance test provides
447
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parameters ensuring the actual transfer of economic benefit
from the transferor to the beneficiary. Actual transfer of
economic benefit is the "substance" taxed by the estate and gift
tax provisions of the Code.
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